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POLITICAL STANDING AND GOVERNMENTAL
ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO
CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
Neal R. Feigenson*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's leading establishment clause decision in 1989, County
of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,' did little to ameliorate
the confusion in a concededly muddled area of constitutional law.' The largest
bloc of Justices-four--concluded that neither a nativity scene inside a county
courthouse nor a large menorah next to an even larger Christmas tree in front
of a local government office building violated the clause. Neither display
threatened to coerce religious belief or to establish a state religion, these Jus-
tices concluded, and so neither was proscribed by the establishment clause,
which permits such governmental acknowledgments of religion as legislative
prayers and theistic mottos on coins.' Three other Justices found both the
creche and the menorah unconstitutional because, through the displays, local
government impermissibly endorsed or promoted religion.4 The remaining two
Justices rejected the creche for the same reason, but viewed the menorah and
tree, in context, as essentially secular symbols which government might prop-
erly sponsor.5 This intermediate position, curiously enough, became the deci-
sion of the Court, since a majority of the Justices concurred in each of its
conclusions.
This outcome certainly invites the same charges of hairsplitting that have
hounded the Court's decisions in the twenty years since Lemon v. Kurtzman
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law, Bridgeport, Connecti-
cut. I wish to thank Martin Margulies, Philip Meyer, Robert Power, and Joseph Fealey for their
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article; Alexander Meiklejohn, for his detailed sugges-
tions on a number of prior drafts; and above all Richard Sherwin, whose penetrating criticism and
constant encouragement inspired me throughout the project.
1. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
2. See infra note 22 and accompanying text (establishment clause doctrine generally agreed to
be confused and unsatisfactory).
3. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134-46
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4. Id. at 3124-29 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5. Id. at 3093-3116 (Blackmun, J.). In addition, Justice Stevens wrote a separate opinion,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, id. at 3129-34, to enunciate a narrower principle: the
establishment clause "create[s] a strong presumption against the display of religious symbols on
public property." Id. at 3131 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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set forth the current canonical framework of establishment clause analysis.'
Yet for the first time, a majority of the Justices adopted a reformulation of
Lemon's threefold requirement that government action have a secular purpose,
not directly aid religion, and not excessively entangle government with reli-
gion.7 The new approach is Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's "no endorsement"
test.
In several opinions written during the last six years, Justice O'Connor has
sought to reexamine and refine the Lemon standards "in order to make them
more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the first amendment."8 Her
analysis begins with the principle that "the religious liberty protected by the
Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to
religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community." 9 She then
asks whether challenged government action sends a message endorsing or dis-
approving religion. Endorsement of religion is impermissible because it "sends
a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are
insiders, favored members of the political community." 10 Justice O'Connor
thus uses the notion of participation in the political community to articulate
the dimensions of religious liberty and diversity that the establishment clause
protects.
In reformulating establishment clause doctrine, Justice O'Connor has identi-
fied two concepts with transformative potential: first, the clause may be read
to prevent government from using religion to affect the political community;
and second, the clause's application depends on the perceived meaning of the
government's action. Justice O'Connor herself, however, has stopped short of
realizing the full implications of these ideas. As a result, her analysis collapses
into a recapitulation of unsatisfactory traditional doctrine.
A fuller exploration of Justice O'Connor's ideas can produce a more intelli-,
gible and intellectually honest theory of the establishment clause. Part I of this
Article locates her ideas in the context of current doctrine.' Part II then con-
6. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see infra note 21 and accompanying text
(Lemon test).
7. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor joined Justice Blackmun in Part Ill-A
of his opinion, in which he explained the "no endorsement" test, and in Part IV of his opinion, in
which he applied the test to the creche. Those four Justices also joined in Part V, in which Justice
Blackmun criticized Justice Kennedy's approach. Only Justice Stevens joined in Part Ill-B, in
which Blackmun explained Lynch v. Donnelly, and no one joined in Part VI, in which Blackmun
analyzed the display of the Christmas tree and menorah.
8. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
9. Id.
10. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Disapproval
sends the opposite message." Id. Since government disapproval of religion is alleged far less often
and since the analysis of that situation is ordinarily the mirror image of the analysis of endorse-
ment, this Article will concentrate on governmental endorsement of religion. But see infra notes
118-22 and accompanying text (discussing law barring clergy from serving in legislature from
both endorsement and disapproval perspectives).
11. See infra notes 16-54 and accompanying text.
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tends that the concept of political standing, which Justice O'Connor uses as a
means to the end of protecting religious liberty, is itself a value that the estab-
lishment clause must protect. Apart from any actual or potential inhibition of
religious liberty, government should strive not to affect any person's political
standing on the basis of her religious views. 12 Part III demonstrates that the
no endorsement test logically protects against disenfranchisement on religious
grounds, and addresses various criticisms in the recent literature.'"
Part IV criticizes Justice O'Connor's method of implementing the no en-
dorsement test. By asking only whether a suitably defined "objective observer"
or "reasonable observer" would perceive endorsement or disapproval of reli-
gion in the government's behavior, Justice O'Connor excludes the perceptions
of the people most in need of the establishment clause's protection: community
members who may be alienated or marginalized by the government action.
Moreover, the "objective observer" fails to achieve her professed goal of pro-
viding more principled decisionmaking. 4
Finally, Part V provides a framework for judicial assessment of the percep-
tions of actual community members. The resulting test will effectuate more
fully Justice O'Connor's insight that government must not use religion so as to
make individuals feel like less than full citizens and equal participants in the
political community.' 5
I. CURRENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE AND JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S
No ENDORSEMENT TEST
The establishment clause of the first amendment provides that Congress
"shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.' 6 The Supreme
Court has held that this proscription covers not only the actual establishment
of a state religion, but also the "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity.' 7
Because religious beliefs and institutions are so much a part of many Amer-
icans' lives, and because the reach of modern government is so extensive, gov-
ernment and religion cannot help but interact in various ways. As the Court
observed in Lemon v. Kurtzman, "total separation [of church and state] is not
possible . . . .Some relationship between government and religious organiza-
tions is inevitable." 18 As a result, establishment clause litigation has generated
12. See infra notes 55-99 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 100-44 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 145-97 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 198-263 and accompanying text.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
.17. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)). It has also been settled since the 1940s that the establish-
ment clause applies to state and local governments. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
18. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); see also Gianella, Religious Liberty,
Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, Part 11: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81
HARV. L. REV. 513, 514 (1968) (acknowledging the expansion of government action subject to the
19901
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"some of the most perplexing questions to come before [the] Court."19
For the past two decades, Chief Justice Burger's distillation of the law in
Lemon has, with few exceptions, guided the courts' analyses of establishment
clause issues.20 Under Lemon, to survive constitutional challenge, government
action must: (1) have a secular purpose, (2) have a principal or primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) foster no excessive entan-
glement with religion.2 1
The Supreme Court and numerous commentators have found fault with the
Lemon test. Its application has resulted in inconsistent decisions, not unified
by any apparent principled rationale.2 2 Especially problematic has been the
establishment clause).
19. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 760. The literature on the establishment clause is enormous, and a
general survey of it is beyond the scope of this Article. Three seminal modern articles are Gi-
anella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1381
(1967) (Part 1); Gianella, supra note 18; and Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme
Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1961). For a recent and brief survey of positions, see McConnell,
You Can't Tell the Players in Church-State Disputes Without a Scorecard, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 27 (1987).
20. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979); Committee for Pub.
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Stark v. Mattheis, 403 U.S. 945 (1971).
Only two establishment clause cases have not applied the Lemon test. See Marsh v. Chambers,
463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Lemon test not used to uphold state legislature's use of chaplain); Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (using strict scrutiny analysis to invalidate charitable solicitation
law under establishment clause because law discriminated between sects).
21. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
22. The jurisprudence of the establishment clause, and the religion clauses generally, has been
called "a mess." Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72
CALIF. L. REV. 817, 839 (1984).
Professor Choper, articulating a typical summary of the Court's decisions, states:
[A] provision for therapeutic and diagnostic health services to parochial school pupils
by public employees is invalid if provided in the parochial school, but not if offered at
a neutral site, even if in a mobile unit adjacent to the parochial school. Reimburse-
ment to parochial schools for the expense of administering teacher-prepared tests re-
quired by state law is invalid, but the state may reimburse parochial schools for the
expense of administering state-prepared tests. The state may lend school textbooks to
parochial school pupils because, the Court has explained, the books can be checked in
advance for religious content and are "self-policing"; but the state may not lend other
seemingly self-policing instructional items such as tape recorders and maps. The state
may pay the cost of bus transportation to parochial schools, which the Court has ruled
are "permeated" with religion; but the state is forbidden to pay for field trip transpor-
tation visits "to governmental, industrial, cultural, and scientific centers designed to
enrich the secular studies of students."
Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict. 41 U. PITT. L.
REV. 673, 680-81 (1980) (quoting Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 252 (1977)) (other citations
omitted) (emphasis in the original).
In Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639 n.7 (1987), Justice Scalia, citing the above passage,
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
determination of what constitutes a "principal or primary effect" that neither
advances nor inhibits religion."
Confronting this confusion, Justice O'Connor has written that "the stan-
dards announced in Lemon should be reexamined and refined in order to make
them more useful in achieving the underlying purpose of the first amend-
ment." '24 She begins by positing that "the Establishment Clause prohibits gov-
ernment from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community."2 She then explains that government can
impermissibly make religion relevant to political standing in either of two
ways. First, government can excessively entangle itself with religion. Entangle-
ment is improper because it interferes with the independence of religious insti-
tutions, gives the members of those institutions access to government not fully
shared by nonmembers, and fosters the creation of political constituencies de-
fined along religious lines. 6
wrote in dissent that the Court's establishment clause jurisprudence was "embarrassing":
[According to Lemon, glovernment may not act with the purpose of advancing reli-
gion, except when forced to do so by the Free Exercise Clause (which is now and
then); or when eliminating existing governmental hostility to religion (which exists
sometimes); or even when merely accommodating governmentally uninhibited reli-
gious practices, except that at some point (it is unclear where) intentional accommo-
dation results in the fostering of religion, which is of course unconstitutional.
Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions:
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 269 & nn.9-12
(1987) (citing to illustrations of doctrinal inconsistencies).
23. The effect prong of the Lemon test is the focus of most establishment clause controversy.
Relatively few establishment clause cases turn on the existence of a secular purpose because gov-
ernment can usually articulate a plausible secular purpose. Exceptions, however, do exist. See,
e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Louisiana statute decreeing equal time for crea-
tion science); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Alabama moment of silence statute); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (Kentucky statute requiring that Ten Commandments be posted
on classroom walls). Notwithstanding these exceptions, it is "often the case [that] the effect of the
statute, rather than its purpose, . . . creates Establishment Clause problems." Bowen v. Kendrick,
487 U.S. 589, 634 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Also, few government actions are invalidated solely because they are found to cause excessive
government entanglement with religion. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (hold-
ing unconstitutional a Pennsylvania statute which authorized public schools to lend private schools
various educational materials, including maps, charts, and films, and to supply them with profes-
sional staff for instruction, guidance, and other services). Indeed, the entanglement test has been
much criticized as a "Catch-22," whereby the government's supervision of a religious institutional
recipient of state aid to prevent impermissibly religious uses of that aid is itself found to involve
the government too much in the institution's affairs, thus violating the clause. See, e.g., Bowen,
487 U.S. at 634 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
24. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 68-69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 69; see also Gianella, supra note 18, at 517 (establishment clause must prevent
intermingling of religious volunteerism and the political process). See generally Dorsen & Sims,
The Nativity Scene Case: An Error of Judgment, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 837, 858 & nn.177-80
(cataloging other constitutional values protected by the establishment clause and citing to Su-
preme Court authority for each).
26. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1983). This concept repeats standard establish-
ment clause theory. However, Justice O'Connor has questioned the validity of using political divi-
1990]
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Second, government makes religion relevant to political standing in a "more
direct" fashion by endorsing or disapproving religion.17 Endorsement implies
that adherents are "insiders" and that nonadherents are "outsiders"; it tells
the former that they are favored members of the political community, and the
latter that they are disfavored. Disapproval sends the opposite messages.28
Thus, the establishment clause prevents government from "convey[ing] a mes-
sage that anyone is inferior or superior because of his or her religion. '"29
According to Justice O'Connor, the no endorsement approach "clarifies the
Lemon test as an analytical device." 30 The first two prongs of that test inquire
whether a challenged government act has a secular purpose, and whether any
effect that advances or inhibits religion is primary or merely "indirect" or "re-
mote."" Under Justice O'Connor's reading, "[t]he purpose prong of the
Lemon test asks whether government's actual purpose is to endorse or disap-
prove of religion. The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's
actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a message of en-
dorsement or disapproval. '3 2
To a certain extent, earlier Supreme Court opinions presaged Justice
O'Connor's focus on the message conveyed by government action. In Walz v.
Tax Commission,8 for example, Justice Harlan approved property tax exemp-
tions for religious organizations on the ground that government did not
thereby "'utiliz[e] the prestige, power, and influence' of a public institution to
bring religion into the lives of citizens." 84 Similarly, in Widmar v. Vincent,'
siveness, traditionally classified under the entanglement prong of Lemon, as an independent reason
to strike down otherwise permissible government aid to religion. "Political divisiveness is admit-
tedly an evil addressed by the Establishment Clause. Its existence may be evidence that institu-
tional entanglement is excessive or that a government practice is perceived as an endorsement of
religion. But ... [t]he entanglement prong of the Lemon test is properly limited to institutional
entanglement." Id. at 689; see also infra note 84 (discussing Justice O'Connor's view of political
divisiveness notion). Justice O'Connor has also questioned more broadly the use of the entangle-
ment test to invalidate government action. See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429-30 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Choper, supra note 22, at 681, cited in Aguilar, 473 U.S. at
430 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
27. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
28. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 69-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 896 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (The "core notion" animating establishment
clause analysis is that government may not place its prestige, coercive authority, or resources
behind religious belief because that "convey[s] the message that those who do not contribute
gladly are less than full members of the community.").
29. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Establishment
Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C.L. REV. 1049, 1051
(1986).
30. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 689.
31. A merely "indirect," "remote," or "incidental" benefit to religion will not render govern-
ment action constitutionally invalid. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771
(1973).
32. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690; see also infra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing
relationship of Justice O'Connor's no endorsement test to Lemon).
33. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
34. Id. at 696 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting in part School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp,
[Vol. 40:53
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Justice Powell wrote that a state university conferred no "imprimatur" or
"sign of approval" on a student religious group by allowing the group access to
classroom space which was also available to over one hundred other student
groups. 6 Further, in Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.,3 7 the Court invalidated a
Massachusetts statute that granted any church the power to prevent the issu-
ance of a liquor license for premises within a five hundred foot radius of the
church. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority that "the mere appear-
ance of a joint exercise of legislative authority by Church and State provides a
significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some."
38
The district court in Donnelly v. Lynch, 9 the Pawtucket, Rhode Island
creche case, also considered the question in this light:
[F]or governmental action to pass muster under the Establishment Clause,
the government must dispel even the appearance of affiliation with the reli-
gious message, for apparent sponsorship is as likely as intentional endorse-
ment to breed religious chauvinism in those whose beliefs are seemingly fa-
vored as "good" or "true," and alienate those whose beliefs are seemingly
dismissed as unworthy of official attention .... [G]overnment sponsorship of
religious beliefs can occur in ways far more subtle than endowing state
churches or mandating acceptance of certain religious rites or tenets. It. can
take the form of "passive" use of objects or symbols that people perceive as
having significant religious meaning in a manner that does not successfully
shift the public perception to the object's nonreligious elements.4
In several cases, beginning with Lynch, Justice O'Connor has applied her
understanding that government may not appear to endorse religion. In Lynch,
she concurred in the majority's decision that Pawtucket's sponsorship of a na-
374 U.S. 203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
35. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
36. Id. at 274.
37. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
38. Id. at 125-26. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct.
3086, 3100-01 (1989), Justice Blackmun writes that the concern about endorsement "has long had
a place in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence," citing cases as old as Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) and School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). Arguably, the
focus on messages of endorsement finds an earlysource in Justice Joseph Story, advocate of gov-
ernment support for religion, who wrote that the last clause of Article VI of the Constitution,
prohibiting religious tests for federal office, was intended "to cut off for ever every pretense of any
alliance between church and state in the national government." J. STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON
THE CONSTITUTION 705 (1833) (emphasis added); see also L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND
FREEDOM 110 (1953) (acknowledging the "widely held belief [during the late eighteenth century]
that religion was not within the competence of civil legislatures").
39. 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D.R.I. 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668
(1984).
40. Id. at 1174-75 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted) (City of Pawtucket's sponsorship
and display of creche in private park as part of Christmas display had "real and substantial effect
of affiliating the City with the Christian beliefs that the creche represents" and thus violated the
establishment clause), afftd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982),(using strict scrutiny test from Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), on grounds that City's ownership and use of nativity scenes
discriminates between Christian and non-Christian religions), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
1990]
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tivity scene as part of a Christmas display did not violate the establishment
clause. In her view, the creche was not intended to communicate endorsement
of Christianity, and did not in fact do so.41 In Wallace v. Jaffree,11 Justice
O'Connor concurred in the Court's decision rejecting an Alabama statute that
provided for a moment of silent meditation or prayer at the start of the public
school day. Since Alabama already had a moment-of-silence statute, the silent
meditation-or-prayer statute could only have been "intended to convey a mes-
sage of state encouragement and endorsement of religion."' 3 And, in more re-
cent establishment clause cases, Justice O'Connor has applied the same
analysis."
Several other Supreme Court Justices have adopted the no endorsement
test, at least in analyzing the effect prong of the Lemon test."5 Indeed, in the
41. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691-93 (1983).
42. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
43. Id. at 76-78 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Since Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority
that the statute failed the secular purpose test, she found it "unnecessary also to determine the
effect of the statute," but wrote anyway that "it also seems likely that the message actually con-
veyed to objective observers by [the silent meditation-or-prayer statute] is approval of the child
who selects prayer over other alternatives during a moment of silence." Id.
44. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 349 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (application of § 702 of
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which exempts religious organizations from ban on religious discrimina-
tion in employment, to nonreligious activity of nonprofit religious corporations does not violate
establishment clause; Justice O'Connor writes in her concurrence: "in my view the objective ob-
server should perceive the government action as an accommodation of the exercise of religion
rather than as a government endorsement of religion"); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 423-26
(1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (New York City's use of federal funds to pay salaries of public
school teachers to provide remedial educational services to disadvantaged parochial school stu-
dents on parochial school grounds under public schools' supervision held to violate establishment
clause; Justice O'Connor writes in dissent:
In light of the ample record [of 19 years of implementation of the program without
any evidence that the program advanced the religious mission of the parochial
schools], an objective observer ... would hardly view it as endorsing the tenets of the
participating parochial schools. To the contrary, the actual and perceived effect of the
program is precisely the effect intended by Congress: [to help impoverished school-
children improve learning skills].);
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Con-
necticut law requiring employers to accede to employees who refuse to work on their Sabbaths
"conveys a message of endorsement of the Sabbath observance," and therefore has an impermissi-
ble effect); see also infra note 237 (discussing Mergens case).
45. See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488-89 (1986)
(Marshall, J.) (Washington State Commission for the Blind's provision of financial vocational
assistance to student pursuing bible studies degree at Christian college does not violate first
amendment; Justice Marshall writes, "the mere circumstance that petitioner has chosen to use
neutrally available state aid to help pay for his religious education [does not] confer any message
of state endorsement of religion"); id. at 493 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment and
concurring in part) ("[n]o reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts before us an infer-
ence that the state itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief'); School Dist. of Grand Rapids
v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 392 (1985) (Brennan, J.) (shared-time program similar to that in Aguilar
except that it paid parochial school teachers to provide remedial services under parochial supervi-
sion; where religious and "public school" classes taught in same rooms on same day to largely the
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three most recent cases, the Court's opinions incorporate the approach. In
Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,40 Justice Brennan wrote for the majority and
quoted in full Justice O'Connor's explanation of her theory in Wallace. Justice
Brennan concluded that a Texas statute exempting religious publications from
a general sales tax violated the establishment clause by endorsing religious
belief.47 In Allegheny County, Justice Blackmun, in an opinion joined by four
other Justices, assessed the constitutionality of two religious displays on gov-
ernment property by asking whether the displays had the purpose or effect of
endorsing religion."' And, in Board of Education v. Mergens,'9 five Justices
agreed with Justice O'Connor that the Equal Access Act, which requires a
public secondary school to allow student religious groups to meet on school
premises if it allows any "noncurriculum related" groups to do so, does not
officially endorse religion.5
Many lower federal courts have utilized Justice O'Connor's approach,5' and
same students, Justice Brennan found that a student "would have before him a powerful symbol of
state endorsement and encouragement of the religious beliefs taught in the same class at some
other time during the day"); id. at 400 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(concluding that Grand Rapids program "has the perceived and actual effect of advancing the
religious aims of the church-related schools").
One recent Supreme Court decision not employing an endorsement analysis is Bowen v. Ken-
drick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). In Bowen, a 5-4 majority ruled that the Adolescent Family Life Act
("AFLA"), under which federal funds are distributed directly to programs affiliated with religious
and nonreligious institutions in order to promote adolescent sexual education, did not "facially"
violate the establishment clause, and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether
the AFLA "as applied" unconstitutionally promoted religious doctrine. Id. at 618-22. Justice
O'Connor concurred, stating that "[p]ublic funds may not be used to endorse the religious mes-
sage [of recipients]," but agreeing that more detailed findings were needed to determine whether
specific grants under the AFLA violated the establishment clause. Id. at 622-23 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). The four dissenting Justices found the record sufficient to support the conclusion that
federal tax dollars had been spent to support religious teaching. Id. at 625-26 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
46. 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
47. Id. at 894.
48. 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3092 (1989); see also supra note 7 and accompanying'text.
49. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
50. Id. at 2356; see also infra notes 234-39 and accompanying text (discussing Mergens case).
Two of those five Justices, Justices Marshall and Brennan, emphasized in a separate opinion that
Westside High School had to take additional steps to avoid the appearance of endorsement.
Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2378-83 (Marshall, J., concurring).
51. See, e.g., Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989) (menorah standing
alone in city hall park conveys unconstitutional message of endorsement of Judaism), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990); Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989)
(religious invocations before football games unconstitutional because they convey message of en-
dorsement of religion); American Jewish Congress v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 127-28 (7th
Cir. 1987) (display of privately owned and constructed creche in lobby of Chicago City-County
Building during holiday season communicated "powerful" and "pervasive" message that City en-
dorsed or identified itself with Christianity and therefore violated establishment clause); ACLU v.
City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561 (6th Cir.) (city's placement of nativity scene on its lawn
during Christmas season unaccompanied by any nonreligious symbols of the holiday violates es-
tablishment clause), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939 (1986); Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs,
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several commentators have lauded it."' Laurence Tribe, for instance, in the
second edition of his constitutional law treatise, calls the no endorsement test
an "important" notion and discusses it at length.53 One federal judge has said
that it is perhaps "one of the most far-reaching doctrinal developments" in
recent establishment clause jurisprudence. 4
While the no endorsement test is promising, it cannot fulfill its promise as
long as the concept of political standing on which the test is based remains
inchoate, and its status as an establishment clause value remains unclear. Part
II first explains why Justice O'Connor's treatment of political standing leads
to difficulties. It then reinterprets political standing as an independent consti-
tutional concern.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND POLITICAL STANDING
All who have adopted the no endorsement test to explain the establishment
781 F.2d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (use of Latin cross and Spanish motto, translated as
"With This We Conquer," on county seal displayed on police cars and elsewhere "conveys a
strong impression to the average observer that Christianity is being endorsed" and thus violates
establishment clause); Joki v. Board of Educ., No. 89-CV-1130 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 1990)
(WESTLAW, Federal library, Dct file) (student painting on wall of public high school auditorium
centrally depicting crucifixion has impermissible primary effect of endorsing Christianity); Smith
v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549 (W.D. Va. 1988) (nativity scene on front lawn of county office
.building had impermissible effect of endorsing religion); Mather v. Village of Mundelein, 699 F.
Supp. 1300 (N.D. I11. 1988) (following Seventh Circuit decision in American Jewish Congress,
finding that creche on front lawn of village hall violates the establishment clause), rev'd, 864 F.2d
1291 (7th Cir. 1989) (creche consistent with Lynch because context sufficiently secular); Jewish
War Veterans of the United States v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1988) (sixty-five foot
high, illuminated Latin cross as war memorial on Marine Corps base in Hawaii "may fairly be
considered to convey a message of governmental endorsement of Christianity"); ACLU v. City of
St. Charles, 622 F. Supp. 1542, 1546 (N.D. I11. 1985) (citing Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Lynch and finding that "primary effect of including an illuminated cross in the city's annual
Christmas display was to place the government's imprimatur on the particular religious beliefs
associated with the Latin cross"), aft'd, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing perceptions of
display of cross but not citing Justice O'Connor); Cf Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 700 F. Supp.
1315, 1321 (D. Vt. 1988) (placing menorah in city hall park during Hanukkah does not violate
establishment clause where perceptions of endorsement of religion were not "objectively reasona-
ble" and where park is open public forum),'rev'd, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2619 (1990); Foremaster v. City of St. George, 655 F. Supp. 844 (D. Utah 1987) (city's
depiction of Mormon temple on logo displayed on plaque at city hall does not violate establish-
ment clause; distinguishes Friedman and in doing so discusses endorsement test); McCreary v.
Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that Village of Scarsdale could not deny private
application to display creche in public park during Christmas based on Widmar and majority
opinion in Lynch, but notes, inter alia, that disclaimer message "will ensure that no reasonable
person will draw an inference that the village supports any church" associated with the display),
affd by an equally divided court sub nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985).
52. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1205, 1212-25, 1284-95 (2d ed.
1987); Beschle, The Conservative as Liberal. The Religion Clauses, Liberal Neutrality, and the
Approach of Justice O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151 (1987); Loewy, supra note 29, at
1051-52.
53. L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1205, 1212-25, 1284-95.
54. Smith v. Lindstrom, 699 F. Supp. 549, 554 (W.D. Va. 1988).
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clause, including Justice O'Connor, agree that the central purpose of the reli-
gion clauses is to safeguard individual religious liberty,55 and believe that the
no endorsement test best serves that purpose. The rationale for the test should,
therefore, connect the protection of political standing with religious liberty.
The explanation might proceed as follows: By making religion relevant to a
person's standing in the political community, government threatens to coerce
or compromise that person's religious beliefs. Especially if the person is made
to feel like an "outsider," she may be led to change religious affiliation so as to
become an "insider," realizing that her beliefs now "cost" her something in
terms of her standing in the secular community. In preventing this indirect
coercion, the establishment clause thus becomes a "prophylactic" against more
direct infringements of religious liberty.
Justice O'Connor, however, adopts neither this nor any other explanation of
how political standing is related to religious liberty. In her concurrence in
Wallace, her fullest exposition of her theory of the clause, she says simply that
"an endorsement [of religion] infringes the religious liberty of the nonadher-
ent, for '[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government is
placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is
plain.' "56 Political standing plays no explicit role in this reasoning. Indeed,
having tied the no endorsement test to the establishment clause's core purpose,
Justice O'Connor devotes no further attention to political standing, and con-
centrates entirely on determining whether government has impermissibly sent
messages endorsing religion. 57
55. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3119 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (establishment clause should "adequately protect the religious liberty
[and] respect the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic political community"). For a
clear statement of the idea without reference to Justice O'Connor's theory, see McCoy & Kurtz,
A Unifying Theory for the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 39 VAND. L. REv. 249
(1986) (threat of political oppression of groups defined by religious belief is "the unifying theme"
of the religion clauses).
56. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)). In his dissenting opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, Justice Brennan
wrote that when government symbolically endorses a certain religious practice, "[t]he effect on
minority religious groups, as well as on those who may reject all religion, is to convey the message
that their views are not similarly worthy of public recognition nor entitled to public support." 465
U.S. 668, 701 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan appears to have in mind here only
those views relating to religion, and so does not conceive the establishment clause as broadly as
suggested in this Article. Cf infra notes 64-144 and accompanying text.
57. Although Justice O'Connor has continued to recite the political standing rubric, she has not
offered any further analysis of the concept. See, e.g., Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3118
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[The creche ... conveys a
message to nonadherents of Christianity that they are not full members of the political commu-
nity, and a corresponding message to Christians that they are favored members of the political
community."); see also Smith, supra note 22, at 309 n.169 (noting that Justice O'Connor does not
define "political standing"). One purpose of this Article is to elaborate the concept of political
standing in a constitutionally plausible way.
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By failing to elaborate on the notion of political standing, Justice
O'Connor's theory remains prone to the difficulties that inhere in any effort to
focus the establishment clause exclusively on indirect threats to religious lib-
erty. Mark Tushnet has summarized the problems with the prophylactic view
of the clause:
First, it is unclear how we are ... to decide how much coercion is too much.
Determining that any coercion at all is too much of course returns us to the
problems of the strict separation approach [i.e., it is impossible for modern
government to avoid all impact on religious sensibilities]. Second, [this ap-
proach] does not explain the psychosocial theory of coercion that underlies
the prophylactic view of the establishment clause. Finally, [it] seems likely
to deprive the establishment clause of any meaning independent of the free
exercise clause. 8
A second traditional attempt to justify the establishment clause as a protec-
tion against religious coercion fails to explain the clause's current scope. By
expending tax revenues to assist religion, government effectively compels some
people to support religion against the dictates of conscience. James Madison,
in his famous "Memorial and Remonstrance," opposed assessments to aid reli-
gion, and his view has been a cornerstone of establishment clause interpreta-
tion ever since. 9 The problem for modern constitutional law is that govern-
ment's provision of general services and benefits is now so extensive that tax
revenues must be spent to "assist" religion. For instance, tax revenues are
spent to provide fire and police services for religious buildings and their
users. 60 To exclude religious entities or believers from such benefits would pro-
duce government discrimination against religion, which the establishment
clause clearly prohibits and which may run afoul of the equal protection clause
as well. In still other circumstances, government may be required, to assist
religion in order to comply with the free exercise clause.6'
58. Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 709 (1986). Note that the
independent establishment clause value explained in this Article avoids at least the second and
third of Professor Tushnet's criticisms: it is not reducible to the values protected by the free exer-
cise clause nor does it necessarily stand as a first shield of defense for them. By reading the
establishment clause as a guarantor of a particular model of secular political community, one
must be ready to leave the protection of religious liberty to the free exercise clause, although
cleansing political discourse of government-sponsored religious influence may have the by-product
of protecting religious liberty. The difficulties of discerning and evaluating alleged violations of
this independent value are discussed in the following parts of the Article.
59. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in 5 THE FoUN-
DERS' CO sTITUTION 82-84 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); cf Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 n.31 (1977) (citing Madison in support of proposition that compulsory
political contributions violated claimants' free speech rights).
60. See, e.g., Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976) (establishment
clause does not prevent religious groups from enjoying general benefits provided by government).
61. See. e.g.. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (Florida's re-
fusal to award unemployment compensation benefits to Seventh Day Adventist Church member
after she was discharged for refusing to work on her Sabbath violated free exercise clause of first
amendment); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (state compelled to modify its unem-
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Even such a consensus position as that the establishment clause forbids di-
rect Congressional aid to religious sects for their religious missions seems un-
justified if the sole purpose of the clause is to protect religious liberty from
official persecution."2 By falling back on the protection of religious liberty as
the only interest behind the establishment clause, Justice O'Connor fails to
overcome the traditional difficulties of explaining how the clause now serves
that interest. 3
Yet the proposition that Justice O'Connor abandons-that the establish-
ment clause prohibits government from making religion relevant to a person's
standing in the political community-identifies a value that is not reducible to
the protection of religious liberty. Suppose a case obviously within the reach of
the clause: a government prevents adherents of a certain religion from exercis-
ing their right to vote. The action certainly makes adherence to religion more
costly, and its proscription can thus perhaps be justified to protect religious
liberty, subject to Professor Tushnet's criticisms. However, such government
ployment compensation program in order to accommodate Jehovah's Witness); Sherbert v. Ver-
ner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state unemployment compensation programs must accommodate per-
sons discharged because their religious beliefs did not allow them to accede to work requirements).
But cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (free exercise clause does not require
Oregon to exempt users of peyote in Native American religious rites from generally applicable
laws criminalizing drug use). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 52,"at 1167-68 and nn.10-1 1.
62. Nor will expanding the core concept from "religious liberty" to "religious voluntarism" do;
presumably nothing prevents any religious institution from rejecting the proffered government aid.
The prophylactic theory of the establishment clause was much more plausible in the late eight-
eenth century, when governments more readily exercised power to coerce religious belief. Before
and after the Revolution, colonial, and then state, governments established particular churches.
Massachusetts did not disestablish the Congregational Church until 1833. Other states continued
to support religion actively on a nonpreferential basis. See L. LEVY. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
25-62 (1986). Moreover, within the preceding century local governments had tortured and killed
nonconformists. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 71 (2d ed. 1985) (Salem
witchcraft trials).
Professor Smith contends that the disappearance of the evils most prominently in the minds of
those who drafted and ratified the establishment clause could mean that the clause is now largely
superfluous. See Smith, Separation and the "Secular".- Reconstructing the Disestablishment Deci-
sion. 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1029-30 (1989).
Of course, this is not to say that government no longer persecutes adherents of certain religions,
but only that the free exercise clause, rather than the establishment clause, seems designed to
prevent such persecution. But see. e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (free
exercise clause held not to protect Native American religious use of peyote); Lyng v. Northwest
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (free exercise clause held not to prevent
government from destroying sacred Native American sites by constructing logging road).
63. Justice O'Connor continues to emphasize that the establishment clause prohibits more than
just " 'coercive' practices or overt efforts at government proselytization." County of Allegheny v.
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3119 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (responding to the opinion by Justice Kennedy, concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in Oart). But since she limits the clause to "protect[ing] the
religious liberty [and] respect[ing] the religious diversity of the members of our pluralistic politi-
cal community," id., the rationale for prohibiting government endorsement of religion must re-
main that of protecting against indirect coercion of religious belief, for what other logical connec-
tion can there be between the protectable interests she has posited and the harm threatened?
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conduct also infringes another ideal of liberal democracy: that government
should not inject religion into politics.6
As Justice Black observed in the Regents' Prayer case, Engel v. Vitale,6"
"the purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much further than
[preventing indirect coercion of religious belief]. Its first and most immediate
purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to
destroy government and to degrade religion." 66 Government involvement in re-
ligion, even to support it, may co-opt it, and many religious leaders have,
therefore, opposed government "endorsement" of their religious symbols.6"
Moreover, the union of government and religion harms government by impli-
cating the state in religious controversy and by threatening to enlist state
power to exclude and repress the "outsiders. 68
Following Justice O'Connor's cue, we may read the establishment clause to
emphasize this second concern. She envisions a political community in which
no one is disabled from full participation on religious grounds. In seventeenth-
and eighteenth-century England and America, those who did not conform to
the dominant or established church were sometimes allowed to practice their
beliefs but denied full political rights.69 The men who conceived the establish-
ment clause may well have sought precisely to "de-sectarianize" civil authority
and civil rights. 0 In his 1779 "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,"
Thomas Jefferson argued that "our civil rights have no dependance on our
religious opinions, any more than on our opinions in physicks or geometry."7
Indeed, the proposition that the establishment clause prevents government
from making religion relevant to a person's standing in the political commu-
nity extends beyond specific political or civil rights. It prohibits government
from using religion to affect its citizens' participation in the political commu-
64. Of course, whether this "ideal" is an essential or dominant element of liberal democracy, in
theory or in practice, is itself hotly disputed. Cf. infra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (accom-
modationist theories).
65. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
66. Id. at 431; see also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)
("[B]oth religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free
from the other within its respective sphere.").
67. See Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3131-32 & n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (Jewish leaders objected to Pittsburgh's display of menorah); N.Y. Times, July
4, 1989, at A14, col. I (acknowledging that Jewish leaders, other than those of Hasidic sect of
which Chabad is part, deplored Court's decision).
68. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640-41 (1943), quoted in
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 54-55 n.39 (1985).
69. See, e.g., L. PFEFFER, supra note 38, at 106, 126 (political disabilities on religious grounds
persisted in some states after 1791); Smith, supra note 22, at 305 n.158 (acknowledging the exis-
tence of political disabilities on religious grounds in late seventeenth century England) (citing R.
BARLOW, CITIZENSHIP AND CONSCIENCE (1962)).
70. S. MEAD, THE OLD RELIGION IN THE BRAVE NEW WORLD 40-41 (1977).
71. Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
77 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987) (also quoted in Smith, supra note 22, at 305 n.158); the
same language is incorporated into Virginia, Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, in 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 84 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
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nity. After all, the purpose served by ensuring such specific civil rights as the
right to vote, speak freely, hold office, or serve on juries is to guarantee to each
citizen an equal opportunity to wield lawfully the power of persuasion and
thus to help shape political decisions. 72 Equal participation is the ultimate
value. Hence, religion is made relevant to political standing when it affects
that participation, and not just when it affects concrete civil rights.
This ideal of political standing may be derived from at least one theory of
moral and political philosophy on which the creators of the first amendment
drew. As Professor David Richards explains, the freedom of conscience guar-
anteed by the religion clauses implies in the broadest sense the freedom to
make judgments for oneself concerning what is good and right, without gov-
ernmental influence, through the exercise of one's practical reason.7" The
Kantian imperative mandates equal respect for the exercise of that capacity by
others.74 Accordingly, a central ideal of democratic community is to create
"institutions that foster and express such mutual respect for the rational and
reasonable will."' 75 But one employs practical reason not merely to decide mat-
ters of conscience,. which lie beyond the scope of civil government,70 but also to
arrange the material aspects of life, which are the proper concern of the politi-
cal community.77 Political debate should, therefore, preserve both the ability
of each member to participate equally and the entitlement of each member to
72. See, e.g., R. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY 6 (1982) (discussing require-
ments of ideal democracy, which include, among other things, equality in voting, effective partici-
pation, and inclusion of all; also discussing the practical limitations on participation).
73. D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 67-73 (1986) (offering an explanation
of the moral and political theory, expounded primarily by Locke, Bayle, and Kant, from which
Jefferson and Madison derived their views on the proper relationship between church and state).
74. Id. at 79-80, 84; see also J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 205-07 (1971) (principle of
equal liberty of conscience would be selected as initial principle of justice). Rawls observes that
the concept, though commonly associated with Kant, also appears in other writers' works. Id. at
205 n.6.
75. D. RICHARDS, supra note 73, at 80; see also J. RAWLS, supra note 74, at 212 ("[Govern-
ment's] duty is limited to underwriting the conditions of equal moral and religious liberty.").
76. See Jefferson, supra note 71, at 77 ("[tlhe opinions of men are not the object of civil
government."); Madison, supra note 59, at 83 ("[i]n matters of religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of civil society."); see also infra note 79 (discussing framers' belief
that constitutional government was one of constrained powers).
77. This is exemplified in the Constitution's enumeration of the general items of public interest:
"a more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, the common defense, the general welfare, the
blessings of liberty." U.S. CONST. preamble; cf. J. Locke, Letter Concerning Toleratioi, quoted in
D. RICHARDS, supra note 73, at 119 (articulating a list of the general goods which civil govern-
ment might properly take as its object: "life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the pos-
session of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like").
Professor Richards construes the concept of "practical reason" to include both "prudential ra-
tionality," which is concerned with the good, and "moral reasonableness," which is concerned with
the right. D. RICHARDS, supra note 73, at 73. The former concept is closer to the Aristotelian idea
of "practical wisdom," the latter to Kant's "practical reason." For significant differences between
the two notions, compare generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, BOOK VI 152-73 (M. Os-
wald trans. 1962) with I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON (L. Beck trans. 1956); see also
S. KaRNER, KANT 129-65 (1955).
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equal respect. And "equal respect for persons calls for constitutional con-
straints which a legitimate government and community must observe."'78
When government makes religion relevant to political standing, it distorts
ideal political discourse in two ways. First, the liberal ideal of a democratic
political community, as expressed in our constitutional scheme of a limited
government, assumes radical disagreement over conceptions of the good; it is
not the prerogative of government to favor any particular conception.79 When
an individual or group infuses political discourse with religiously based views,
it brings to the debate only one out of many possible perspectives.8 However,
78. D. RICHARDS, supra note 73, at 69. This is Professor Richards' understanding of the con-
cept of the "social contract." See also J. RAWLS, supra note 74, at I I (social contract as basic
principles of justice "that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would
accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association").
Interestingly, this idea is not itself a purely secular concept, but is derived from the religious idea
of the "covenant." See AMERICAN POLITICAL THEOLOGY 14 (C. Dunn ed. 1984) (quoting D.
Elazar, Political Theory of Covenant: Biblical Origins and Development); D. RICHARDS, supra
note 73, at 68-69.
For an analogous explanation of the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech as "a
deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues ... be decided by universal
suffrage," see A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 25-27,
38-39, 63-70, 88-91 (1948); cf. L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 117 (1986) (protecting
extremist speech counters natural impulse to intolerance by fostering habits of tolerance which are
essential to self-governing political society based on willingness to compromise).
79. On the framers' understanding that constitutional government was to be one of constrained
powers, that government was simply not competent in certain matters, including religion, see, for
example, L. LEVY, supra note 62, at 65-66 (some opposed establishment clause because they
thought it unnecessary to prohibit government from doing that which the constitution gave it no
power to do in the first place).
On the ideal that government not identify itself with any particular conception of the good,
Professor Richards states:
The specific concern of the antiestablishment clause is that, in contexts of belief
formation and revision, the state not illegitimately (nonneutrally) endorse any one
conception (whether religious or secular) from among the range of conceptions of a
life well and humanely lived that express our twin moral powers of rationality and
reasonableness. For this reason, the antiestablishment principle rejects as its criterion
any such substantive conception, and requires that state power in the relevant con-
texts pursue the general goods consistent with rational and reasonable choice of any
such substantive conceptions.
D. RICHARDS, supra note 73, at 149; see also J. RAWLS, supra note 74, at 212 (constitution
renders government incompetent to make value judgments regarding the legitimacy or illegitimacy
of religious associations); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 76-77 (1975) (liberal political
order eschews conception of general good because values are understood as irreducibly subjective);
lngber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV.
233, 283-84 & nn.308-17 (1989) (recognizing that American ideal of political community derived
from Enlightenment theories of secularism and voluntarism in public affairs; state must be value-
neutral).
80. Cf P. BERGER. THE SACRED CANOPY 137 (1967) (in pluralist society, religious groups
compete with each other and with nonreligious groups in defining the world); Ingber, supra note
79, at 284 & n.314 (cites sources for "marketplace of ideas" doctrine of liberal democracy).
Whether it is desirable for political discourse to be conducted partially in sectarian terms is an-
other matter. See infra notes 89-90.
1990] ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 69
when government promotes religion or religious belief-by offering religious
justifications for policy or even by simply acknowledging private religiosity as
good in itself-government approves of policy choices being grounded in reli-
gious belief without similarly approving the opposite.81 By doing so, govern-
ment prefers at least partially religious to exclusively nonreligious justifica-
tions for policy, and thus tends to identify itself with a particular religious
conception of the good, violating one premise of liberal democracy.
Second, the legitimacy of policy decisions in a democracy derives from the
participation of those affected by the policies.8" Once government makes reli-
gion relevant to political discourse, some who are not members of the favored
religion and who do not share those conceptions will be marginalized: they will
no longer feel that they can participate equally in the formulation of policies,
or will be perceived by others as less worthy participants.83 This unequal par-
ticipation undermines the legitimacy of the policies chosen.8
81. Justice O'Connor, of course, disputes this: "Clearly, the government can acknowledge the
role of religion in our society in numerous ways that do not amount to an endorsement." County
of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3121 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original); see also Board of
Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2382 (1990) (concurring in judgment instead of joining Jus-
tice O'Connor's opinion, Justices Marshall and Brennan observe that in absence of disclaimers,
Westside High School implicitly considers Christian Club, like all other extracurricular student
groups, to be part of a program to develop "citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good human rela-
tions, knowledge and skills," and that this violates establishment clause); id. at 2380 ("[A]lthough
a school may permissibly encourage its students to become well-rounded as student-athletes, stu-
dent-musicians, and student-tutors, the Constitution forbids schools to encourage students to be-
come well-rounded as student worshippers.").
82. See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776) ("That to secure these
rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed .... "); R. DAHL, supra note 72, at 4-6; cf. J. RAWLS, supra note 74, at 229-30
("[T]he chief merit of the principle of participation is to insure that government respects the
rights and welfare of the governed.").
83. The social psychology of this process of exclusion and marginalization is discussed infra
notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
84. Cf Ingber, supra note 79, at 323-24 & nn.566-67 (government favoritism of religion
"tend[s] to . . . undermin[e] the political process's normal functioning"); Sherwin, Dialects and
Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 729
(1988) (to ensure legitimacy of judicial decisions, legal doctrine should not enshrine one mode of
analysis to the exclusion of others, but should promote community of discourse and mutual per-
suasion based on open acknowledgment of strengths and weaknesses of competing modes).
The argument presented here extends or at least restates the recognized tenet that the establish-
ment clause should prevent government from fomenting political divisiveness along religious lines.
The opposite of (violent) divisiveness is not uniformity, but pluralist dialogue; not the elimination
of controversy, but the maintenance of a community of conversation in which persuasion of the
other is possible. Persuading the other means recognizing the other's right to participate in the
dialogue; otherwise, political debate becomes "civil war carried on by other means." A.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 236 (1981). The focus here, therefore, is on ensuring equal participa-
tion, regardless of any special potential for divisiveness created by the alignment of political posi-
tions along religious lines.
Justice O'Connor writes: "Political divisiveness is admittedly an evil addressed by the Clause."
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 669, 689 (1983). Yet Justice O'Connor also believes that such divi-
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Justice Blackmun wrote recently that "[tihe Establishment Clause, at the
very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions
of religious belief."85 The appearance is improper because, among other
things, it implies that consistency with a particular religious belief is relevant
to the wisdom of a policy decision.8" Consider an analogy from a limited uni-
verse of discourse over which government exercises control: the trial. Federal
Rule of Evidence 610 provides that "[e]vidence of the beliefs or opinions of a
witness on matters of religion is not admissible for the purpose of showing that
by reason of their nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced."87 A
witness's credibility affects the weight the fact finder will accord to his or her
observations and opinions, just as a person's standing in the political commu-
nity may affect the weight others will give to his or her attempts at political
persuasion. While the goals of the two processes differ-an accurate determi-
nation as to liability or guilt in the one, a wise policy in the other-the princi-
ple is the same in each: government should not promote the use of religion to
affect the deliberative process.88
siveness is not an independent test of the constitutional validity of government action. Id. She
writes that "guessing the potential for political divisiveness ... is simply too speculative." Id. One
may wonder how Justice O'Connor reconciles that conclusion with her position that the seemingly
more speculative concept of "relevance to political standing" is an independent test, indeed the
only test, of constitutionality. The answer may lie in her belief that the impact of governmental
messages on political standing may be determined "objectively." See infra notes 145-97 and ac-
companying text.
85. Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3101.
86. Professor Tribe has offered another argument, albeit a somewhat circular one, against gov-
ernment's use of religious means. Such conduct "entails government's lending a religious organiza-
tion an inherently state power: the power of official endorsement through government speech." L.
TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1286 (citing Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982)).
87. FED. R. EvID. 610. Note the similarity between this exclusionary rule of evidence and Jus-
tice O'Connor's "exclusionary rule" for government speech: each prohibits use of, or reference to,
religion to strengthen or to weaken the message presented.
88. Government's complete authority to regulate the trial process effectively extends its impri-
matur in some form to the entire proceeding; the trial is not even a limited open forum. By
contrast, political discussions may be conducted in large part outside governmental channels and
by non-governmental actors. Yet it seems reasonable to draw an analogy between discourse at
trial and discourse in the political community insofar as government affects it. Of course, the
establishment clause does not prohibit religious considerations not injected by government. See
infra notes 89-91.
Another difference between the trial and the political community at large concerns the respec-
tive roles of juror and voter or officeholder. A juror's sole function is to determine what happened;
truth should be the only goal and the credibility of the witness the only relevant variable. A
policymaker's functions are much more variegated. Arguably, it is proper for the policymaker to
consider who the proponents of a given position are, and not solely the wisdom of their particular
proposal, because her job is to accomplish overall the best compromises of competing interests on
many issues. The religious orientation of the proponents may well be relevant to that larger func-
tion. Nevertheless, the value of equal participation and the right of each citizen to equal respect
for her views remains paramount.
It might also be pointed out that in the very context chosen here to illustrate how the establish-
ment clause should forbid government from injecting religious considerations into secular dis-
course, witnesses may be required to swear an oath concluding "so help me God." Applying the
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This is not to say that the establishment clause should prevent private indi-
viduals and groups from drawing upon religious conviction when debating pub-
lic policy, from seeking to enact laws that are consonant with those convic-
tions, or from opposing laws that are not. That proscription would be futile
even if it were desirable.89 Nor should the clause attempt to extirpate religious
motivation from the behavior of government actors.9" But government may not
analysis suggested in this Article might very well lead to the invalidation of this oath. Alterna-
tively, the courts might exercise a "prudent abstention" and decline to review such entrenched
public customs. See L. Levy, supra note 62, at 127; see also infra notes 261-63 and accompany-
ing text (Tushnet's recommendation based on "civic republicanism").
89. See generally K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988)
(participants in liberal democracy may properly rely on religious convictions in deciding policy
matters). Much recent literature advocates the reintroduction or promotion of religiously based
values in the public sphere. See, e.g., R. NEUHAUS. THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE (1984). But
discourse suffers to the extent that argument is grounded only in privately accessible reasons, as
explicitly sectarian argument tends to be, since genuine persuasion is impossible unless the speaker
can engage the listener on terms the latter can share. See, e.g., K. GREENAWALT, supra, at 217
("The common currency of political discourse is nonreligious argument about human welfare.
Public discourse about political issues with those who do not share religious premises should be
cast in other than religious terms."); R. NEUHAUS, supra, at 36 ("A dilemma ... facing the
religious new right is simply this: it wants to enter the political arena making public claims on the
basis of private truths. The integrity of politics itself requires that [this] be resisted. Public deci-
sions must be made by arguments that are public in character.") (emphasis omitted); J. RAWLS,
supra note 74, at 216 (it is preferable that limits on tolerance be justified by reasons accessible to
all rather than by principles of faith, because it is otherwise not possible to argue that the limits
have been incorrectly drawn); see also Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion
in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 543, 604-05 (1988) (judicial discourse should exemplify
shared understanding: "[tihe prudent arbiter ... must create a shared world by speaking the
other's tongue").
But if public argument must be couched in publicly accessible language, a conflict arises: it
seems that the religious person must dissemble in public in order to persuade. Professor Tribe
writes that "when religious believers arrive at political debates, they must check their beliefs at
the door or risk losing their efficacy." L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1277. But the establishment
clause cannot bounce them if they fail to do so. See infra note 90; cf. K. GREENAWALT, supra. at
220-21 (religious person is not insincere when making public arguments in nonreligious terms,
since "political discourse mainly involves advocacy of positions arrived at, not full revelation of all
the bases by which a decision is reached," and "[e]ffective argument appeals to grounds that the
audience can accept").
90. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 89, at 231-39 (discussing extent to which government
officials may draw on religious conviction in deciding political matters).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the establishment clause does not mean that public
discourse must be free from religious influences or that religiously motivated persons may not
participate:
"Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently take strong posi-
tions on public issues including . . . vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional posi-
tions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that
right."
• ..The Establishment Clause does not license government to treat religion and
those who teach or practice it, simply by virtue of their status as such, as subversive
of American ideals and therefore subject to unique disabilities.
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 640-41 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting in part Walz
v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970)); see also lngber, supra note 79, at 323 & n.561
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
indicate a preference for political discourse that is grounded in religious be-
lief.9 And government-given its power in general, the violence with which it
stands ready to enforce its decisions,92 and its authority over channels of com-
munication in particular-is uniquely able to influence the discourse.9 3 Indeed,
as Dean Mark Yudof writes, the establishment clause "is the only substantive
constitutional restraint on what governments may say." '94
Some advocate narrower constructions of the establishment clause, favoring
even greater governmental "accommodation" of religion than the Supreme
Court has permitted. In the Pittsburgh holiday displays case, as noted earlier,
Justice Kennedy wrote that the establishment clause forbids only government
action that coerces support for religion or tends to establish a state religion.95
Chief Justice Rehnquist has interpreted the clause to prohibit only governmen-
tal preference of one religion or sect over another.96 Others have contended
that the clause requires only the institutional separation of church and state.9"
(acknowledging that religious institutions have the "right to participate in public dialogue sur-
rounding public policy issues"); cf. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing majority's rejection of creationism statute on grounds of legislature's im-
proper motivation); L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1279-82 (six reasons why government should not
seek to reduce religious-based political divisiveness).
91. Although it will usually be fairly clear whether government is acting, there will no doubt be
borderline cases. For instance, how prominently must a government office display religious decora-
tions before the display becomes "government's" public act? Does a legislator advocating a posi-
tion on the floor of her house of representatives speak for government?
These questions may be analyzed using the method proposed in Part V below. See infra notes
198-263 and accompanying text. Consider, for instance, the case of the legislator during floor
debate. Assume, for purposes of argument, some perception that the government endorses religion
when an elected representative explicitly draws on or refers to religious values during debate. Does
government have an important secular purpose in permitting such behavior? Obviously, the an-
swer is yes: free debate on public issues is the very essence of democratic government. Is there any
way of achieving that purpose that would be less likely to engender perceptions that government
had taken a position on religion? It is difficult to conceive of one. Indeed, to limit such speech
would seem contrary to another portion of the first amendment.
92. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986); Cover, The Bonds of Consti-
tutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. REv. 815 (1986).
93. See M. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 6 (1983) (noting government's ever increas-
ing opportunity to communicate to the public in an abusive fashion). See generally Mitchell,
Secularism in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U.L. REV. 603, 692-94 &
nn.417-27 (1987) (noting that government speech is pervasive and contributes to marketplace of
ideas, but also that government speech may threaten personal autonomy).
94. M. YUDOF, supra note 93, at 214.
95. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3136 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Choper, supra note 22, at 675
(establishment clause prevents government only from coercing or influencing religious belief); Mc-
Connell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 146 (1986) (the balance be-
tween the clauses requires nothing more than neutrality).
96. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also R. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (1982) (history of drafting and ratification of establishment
clause supports preferentialist interpretation). Contra L. LEVY, supra note 62 (drafting and ratifi-
cation of clause refutes preferentialist position).
97. See Smith, supra note 62; see also ACLU v. Wilkinson, 701 F. Supp. 1296, 1308-09 (E.D.
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One federal district court judge recently described the "wall of separation" as
having "been rehabbed . . . to the point where it is more like a wrought iron
fence-still a definite barrier, but permitting communication from one side to
the other."9
A detailed response to each of these competing views is beyond the scope of
this article. Arguably, the language and history of the establishment clause
and its various interpretations by the courts make each of these options and
more quite plausible; which view one prefers, to paraphrase Professor Michael
McConnell, depends largely on one's view of the proper relation between
church and state.9" It suffices for now that understanding the establishment
clause to prevent government from making religion relevant to political stand-
ing appears validly grounded in the language of the clause, in earlier authori-
tative interpretations, and in a worthwhile vision of American society.
III. THE No ENDORSEMENT TEST AND THE PROTECTION OF POLITICAL
STANDING
The question remains whether Justice O'Connor's no endorsement
test-that the establishment clause prohibits government from acting so as to
send messages of endorsement or disapproval of religion-offers a logical and
feasible way to prevent government from making religion relevant to political
standing. This Part first explains the connection between government's en-
dorsement of religion and its impact on political standing. This Part then de-
fends Justice O'Connor's focus on messages of inclusion or exclusion, and the
broad conception of political standing that it implies against criticisms in the
recent literature.
One reason that governmental endorsement of religion affects standing in
the political community is that religious principles tend to comprise a total
.world view for their adherents.' 0 When government promotes religious beliefs,
it will be understood to favor the policy views that the holders of those beliefs
Ky. 1988) (citing Myers, The Establishment Clause and Nativity Scenes: A Reassessment of
Lynch v. Donnelly, 77 Ky. L... 61 (1988)), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1990).
98. Wilkinson, 701 F. Supp. at 1314.
99. See infra note 185 and accompanying text; Tushnet, supra note 58 (lack of consensus
about scope of religion clauses inevitably results from disagreement over fundamental vision of
society that the clauses represent). On inconclusiveness of historical evidence, compare R. CORD,
supra note 96, at 3-15 (1982) (history of drafting and ratification of establishment clause supports
preferentialist interpretation) with L. LEVY, supra note 62 (drafting and ratification of clause
refutes preferentialist position) and L. PFEFFER, supra note 38, at 139-47 (same). See also R.
MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT 69-71 (1968) (historical support for almost any
position may be found).
100. See, e.g., P. BERGER, supra note 80, at 1-51 (religion is traditionally a crucial part of
human construction and maintenance of social world); R. NEUHAUS, supra note 89, at 18 (funda-
mentalism is a "comprehensive public world view for many Americans"); Ladd, Politics and Reli-
gion in America: The Enigma of Pluralism, in RELIGION, MORALITY, AND THE LAW: NOMOs
XXX 263, 271 (J. Roland Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1988) (religion represents "an ultimate
and absolute type of value-system" and claims "superiority over all other value-systems").
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espouse."0' Thus, a governmental "celebration of religious diversity" 02 will not
appear to everyone as merely an acknowledgment of private religiosity. Those
who think that religious belief has a public role,' 03 whether adherents or non-
adherents, will tend to perceive government's preference for the policy views of
the chosen religions. Government's display of religious symbols is not the same
as its sponsorship of an ethnic food festival. The totalizing aspect of religion
also creates a spillover effect from one public policy issue to another: when
government makes religion relevant in general or in one context, citizens will
take religion to be relevant in other contexts and on other issues as well.
Moreover, because religious identification is so often primary in adherents'
conceptions of themselves and of others,' people will tend to believe not only
that a particular point of view is valid because it coincides with particular
religious beliefs but also that the points of view of people who do not share
those beliefs cannot be valid. Madison may have recognized this when he ob-
jected to a proposed assessment to support religious teachers, in part, because
it "degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in Reli-
gion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority."' 05
101. Members of any given organized religion may be found on different sides of most major
political issues; nevertheless, certain religious institutions have identifiable "party lines" which
dictate their adherents' positions on a range of issues. See generally R. MORGAN, supra note 99.
102. This, of course, is how Justice O'Connor interpreted the Christmas tree and menorah dis-
play in County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
103. See R. NEUHAUS, supra note 89 (public aspects of religious belief).
104. See, e.g., Ladd, supra note 100, at 271 (stating that because most religious value systems
are based in belief in transcendental deity,
the values proceeding from [that belief are] more exigent in a number of ways, in-
cluding emotionally and psychologically, than . . . the values of an atheist or natural-
ist. For someone who does not share the beliefs on which a theological morality is
grounded, it is easy to underestimate their power in the life of believers);
see also id. at 273 ("[R]eligious doctrines of every kind draw a line between insiders and outsid-
ers, the faithful and others,").
105. Madison, supra note 59, at 83, para. 9; see also Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the
Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. UL. REV. 1113, 1164-69 (1988) (government endorsement of reli-
gion tends to exclude the offended from the political community by attacking their most funda-
mental beliefs).
For one perception of the connection between religious belief and political standing, see M.
SILK, SPIRITUAL POLITICS 159-61 (1988), describing the reaction of Milton Tobian, chair of the
Southwest region of the American Jewish Committee, to a speech at the conservative Religious
Roundtable's National Affairs Briefing during the 1980 campaign. One speaker, a Baptist pastor,
proclaimed that "God Almighty does not hear the prayer of a Jew." Tobian was taping the pro-
ceedings, and later circulated a transcript to other Jewish leaders. Tobian described the Briefing
as "'the first major public demonstration' of a movement capable of separating 'American Jews
from effective participation and influence in American decision making.'" Id.
Of course, Jewish sensitivity to state sponsorship of religion is not new. A generation ago, Will
Herberg wrote that:
The intrusion of religion into education and public life, the weakening of the "wall of
separation" between religion and the state, is feared [by Jews] as only too likely to
result in situations in which Jews would find themselves at a disadvantage-greater
isolation, higher "visibility," an accentuation of minority status.
W. HERBERG, PROTESTANT CATHOLIC JEW 255 (1955).
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Americans may approve of ideals of mutual respect and tolerance in the
abstract, but tolerance declines when people are confronted with specific in-
stances of unpopular or "outsider" speech. As Professor Michael Corbett re-
ports,106 while over eighty percent of persons in a survey conducted in the late
1950s agreed with such propositions as "I believe in free speech for all no
matter what their views might be," barely one-third of the respondents to an-
other survey taken at about the same time were willing to allow speech by
atheists at all; only one in eight would permit an atheist to teach in college. 107
Although the latter figures increased to three-fifths and two-fifths, respec-
tively, by the late 1970s,' °8 Professor Corbett still concludes that "Americans
do not give equal support to the rights of different groups to express their
views." 0 9
It has, nevertheless, been argued that when government appears to promote
religion in general, as opposed to particular creeds, the threat to establishment
clause interests is diluted. Often leading the list of "unobjectionable" govern-
ment actions are such nondenominational messages as "In God We Trust" on
coins and the Supreme Court's own "God save this honorable Court.""' These
messages, however, can be just as harmful as more overtly sectarian conduct.
First, every attempt to define a community of believers, no matter how ecu-
menical, necessarily excludes those who do not share in the belief."' Refer-
ence to belief in a Supreme Being may be broader than reference to Christian-
ity, but still excludes agnostics and atheists."' Second, no one adheres to
religion in general. Each believer belongs to a particular religion, and a gov-
ernment official who promotes God will be understood by many observers to be
promoting either his own beliefs or whatever beliefs predominate among those
of his class and ethnic group.'"3 Similarly, because there is no symbol of reli-
106. M. CORBETT, POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN AMERICA: FREEDOM AND EQUALITY IN PUBLIC
ATTITUDES 28-45 (1982).
107. Id. at 29, 36.
108. Id. at 36.
109. Id. at 45. Corbett also writes: "The right to religious freedom (including separation of
church and state) of those who are not religious or those whose religious views are outside the
Protestant-Catholic mainstream tends to be treated rather lightly by Americans." Id.; see also L.
BOLLINGER, supra note 78, at 109-10 (individual whose fellow citizens brand him as atheist or
similar nonconformist may become "socially and economically a pariah").
110. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
111. See Ladd, supra note 100, at 273. For a lyrical depiction of the exclusion produced by
efforts to include, see M. KUNDERA, THE BOOK OF LAUGHTER AND FORGETTING 62-63, 65-68 (M.
Heim trans. 1980). Of course,, the broader the message, the fewer the "outsiders," but this is no
justification for such conduct, because some persons will still be marginalized on religious grounds.
112. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952) ("We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. ... )
113. Cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 822-23 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice
Stevens made the following comment regarding a Nebraska practice of beginning each legislative
day with a prayer led by a state-paid chaplain, which was upheld by the majority:
In a democratically elected legislature, the religious beliefs of the chaplain tend to
reflect the faith of the majority of the lawmakers' constituents. Prayers may be said
by a Catholic priest in the Massachusetts Legislature and by a Presbyterian minister
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gion "in general," much less of irreligion, any effort to acknowledge symboli-
cally religion in general, or religious diversity, must employ the symbols of
various particular faiths. Government then runs the risk of appearing to en-
dorse not all religion, but only the religions whose symbols it displays. This is
exactly the scenario in the second holiday display at issue in Allegheny
County.1 14
Justice O'Connor's premise that official endorsement of religion affects po-
litical standing has been challenged. Professor Steven Smith argues that, even
assuming the truth of Justice O'Connor's assertions about the purpose of the
establishment clause and the message that government sponsorship of religion
sends, her approach fails because there is "no plausible link," no necessary
connection, between the two. 115 Smith contends that some laws, such as a law
barring clergy from serving in the legislature, can alter political status on the
basis of religion without necessarily expressing approval or disapproval of reli-
gion. The reverse, Professor Smith claims, is also true: some government ac-
tion, such as putting "In God We Trust" on coins, appears to endorse religion
without altering political standing in any realistic sense. Professor Smith con-
cludes that "[i]f the goal of the establishment clause is to make political
standing independent of religion . . . the proper doctrinal direction 'seems al-
in the Nebraska Legislature, but I would not expect to find a Jehovah's Witness or a
disciple of Mary Baker Eddy or the Reverend Moon serving as the official chaplain in
any state legislature.);
Jager v. Douglas County School Dist., 862 F.2d 824, 831 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that Protes-
tantism is the majority religion in the county and that most past pregame invocation speakers had
been Protestant ministers, and therefore rejecting "equal access" plan for religious invocations
before school football games).
114. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1286 (by using religious symbols, government "will almost
invariably violate denominational neutrality") (referring to Marsh, 463 U.S. at 823 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)); County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3128
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing offensiveness of Pitts-
burgh's message of "religious pluralism").
Justice O'Connor, analyzing the "Salute to Liberty" in Allegheny County, seeks to explain how
Pittsburgh not only avoided endorsing Judaism or Christianity in particular, but also religion in
general over nonreligion. She admits that the menorah is "the central religious symbol and ritual
object of [a] religious holiday," but argues that by juxtaposing that symbol next to the "predomi-
nantly secular" Christmas tree and accompanying both with a message "salut[ing] liberty," Pitts-
burgh "conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season," rather
than an endorsement of religion over nonreligion. Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3122-23
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). According to Justice
O'Connor, the city's choice of that "secular" symbol of the Christmas holiday season merely ac-
knowledged "a public holiday celebrated by religious and nonreligious citizens alike." Id. at 3123.
This begs the question of how the nonreligious "celebrate" the holiday. Does the closure of the
atheist's workplace to mark the anniversary of Jesus's birth indicate equal footing for the beliefs
of the religious and the nonreligious? Additionally, why do "only holidays stemming from Christi-
anity, not those arising from other religions, favorably dispose the government towards 'plural-
ism'?" Id. at 3126 n.* (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Again, Justice
O'Connor's answer is based on what the "reasonable" observer would perceive. See infra notes
145-97 and accompanying text.
115. Smith, supra note 22, at 305-09.
[Vol. 40:53
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
most embarrassingly plain: ... [to] develop doctrine which invalidates laws or
practices that affect political or civil rights on religious grounds." Justice
O'Connor's focus on symbolic effects is "at best a less than faithful proxy for
the goal the Court seeks to achieve.""1 6
Yet Professor Smith's paradigm cases fail to show that the endorsement or
disapproval of religion is "practically and analytically distinct" from the effect
on political standing.11 7 Consider first his example of a law that prevents the
clergy from serving in the legislature. " 8 He writes:
Such a law might reflect disapproval of religion, implying that ministers
are unfit for public office. Conversely, the law might suggest approval of
religion; it might evince a belief that ministers are too virtuous, or are en-
gaged in too important a calling, to be sullied and distracted by mundane
political pursuits. Or the law might reflect neither approval nor disapproval
of religion, but merely a belief that both religion and politics are better off
when kept apart."'
This law "affects political status on the basis of religion whether or not [it]
also endorses or disapproves of religion."' 20 Its symbolic aspect is thus beside
the point. Therefore, Professor Smith claims, Justice O'Connor's no endorse-
ment test is, in this case, simply irrelevant to the goal of preventing religion
from affecting political standing. It is an underinclusive means of reaching its
stated goal, because it fails to reach a case that plainly affronts the acknowl-
edged purpose of the establishment clause.
The law barring clergy from the legislature is obviously a peculiar case for
Justice O'Connor's schema. Those adherents of religion who perceive the law
as approving religion cannot possibly draw the inference that Justice O'Connor
posits in such cases-that they are therefore "insiders" in the political commu-
nity-since the law itself tends to exclude them from participation. However,
no such logical conundrum defeats the application of Justice O'Connor's test
to those who perceive the law as disapproving religion.' Indeed, the law
facially disadvantages some people on the basis of their religious calling.
Stronger support for the plausibility of perceptions of exclusion and disap-
proval is difficult to imagine. Whether many people view the law as neither
endorsing nor disapproving religion is inconsequential for Justice O'Connor's
purposes so long as some people perceive it as doing one or the other. 22
116. Id. at 309.
117. Id.
118. The law that Professor Smith has in mind is Tennessee's law excluding the clergy from
public office, which was struck down by the Supreme Court in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618
(1978).
119. Smith, supra note 22, at 306-07 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
120. Id. at 307 (emphasis in original).
121. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 636 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring) (under Lemon
test, Tennessee law "has a primary effect which inhibits religion"). The majority decided McDan-
iel on free exercise and not establishment clause grounds. Id. at 628-29.
122. In the case of the invalidation of religious oath requirements, Smith hypothesizes histori-
cal evidence of nonreligious original intent so persuasive that "everyone" concludes the law neither
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The text of the law also presents convincing evidence of impermissible legis-
lative intent. 2s Justice O'Connor's proscription of messages perceived to en-
dorse or disapprove religion may not be necessary to invalidate such a law. But
this does not imply that her proscription is an unsound device for guarding
against both blatant and subtle encroachments of religion on political
standing.
Professor Smith's other paradigm-the invocation which opens a legislative
session, or the motto "In God We Trust" minted on coins-seems to present a
more serious difficulty for the no endorsement test. "[N]o one loses the right
to vote, the freedom to speak, or any other state or federal right if he or she
does not happen to share the religious ideas that such practices appear to ap-
prove."12" Professor Tushnet expresses the same thought:
[It is not clear why symbolic exclusion should matter so long as "nonadher-
ents" are in fact actually included in the political community. Under those
circumstances, nonadherents who believe that they are excluded from the
political community are merely expressing the disappointment felt by every-
one who has lost a fair fight in the arena of politics."'
Yet under Justice O'Connor's theory, government action that lacks a concrete
effect on political standing is, nevertheless, invalid if it endorses religion.
This difficulty is more apparent than real, however, because the scope of
establishment clause protection extends beyond specific civil rights. The estab-
lishment clause "focuses not on the specific individual but on the community
of believers (or nonbelievers) and the society at large."' 26 Alone among the
provisions of the first eight amendments, the establishment clause primarily
concerns the structure of government, touching on individual interests only
secondarily.' 27 Select any other clause in those amendments, and the personal
endorses nor disapproves of religion. Smith, supra note 22, at 307 n.165. In such a case, Smith
rightly concludes, " 'endorsement' and [political] 'status alteration' represent distinct, and severa-
ble, consequences of the law." Id. Of course, in a hypothetical world where everyone gauged the
impact of government on religion in the same way, there would be very little establishment clause
litigation.
123. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 77-78 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (infer-
ring impermissible legislative purpose from statutory language authorizing moment of silent medi-
tation or prayer, compared to language of prior statute authorizing moment of silent meditation).
124. Smith, supra note 22, at 307.
125. Tushnet, supra note 58, at 712.
126. lngber, supra note 79, at 322 & n.556.
127. Mark de Wolfe Howe wrote:
[I1n so far as national power is concerned we are compelled by our respect for the
intention of the framers to read the non-establishment clause of the First Amendment
as a barrier not only to federal action which infringes religious and other liberties of
individuals but as a prohibition of even those federal aids to religion which do not
appreciably affect individual liberties.
M. DE WOLFE HOWE, RELIGION IN A FREE SOCIETY (1958), reprinted in J. WILSON & D.
DRAKEMAN, CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 217 (2d ed. 1987). But cf. A.
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 78 (free speech clause justified primarily in terms of ideal of self-govern-
ment rather than individual liberty); see also Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 145-46
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interest infringed by a violation comes promptly to mind. A government re-
striction on publication, for instance, directly infringes the publisher's right of
free speech. A convict's right not to be subjected to cruel and unusual punish-
ment is violated when government imposes such a punishment, regardless of
how "cruel and unusual" may be defined. The personal values protected by the
establishment clause are not so immediately implicated when the clause is
violated 28
Accordingly, as Justice Black wrote in Engel v. Vitale, 2' the clause "does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is vio-
lated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether
those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not."'13 The
establishment clause prevents government sponsorship of religion in order to
protect against an atmosphere that is at odds with the liberal ideal of a secular
political community. The evil that endorsement produces is not so much that
identifiable individuals are actually led to drop out of the participatory democ-
racy (much less that their freedom of religious belief is coerced or influenced)
as that government has restructured public discourse along religious lines. To
those who perceive government endorsement of religion in financial aid to pa-
rochial schools, the true harm is not so much direct personal injury, financial
or otherwise, as it is a change in the nature of the political community. The
plaintiff's own injury is but a symptom of the more significant structural
damage.
The political standing protected by the establishment clause obviously en-
compasses Smith's and Tushnet's "actual inclusion" in the community, invali-
dating laws that exclude persons from voting or from serving in the legislature
because of their religion, but it must go further. For instance, assume that a
state adopted a new flag with distinctively sectarian religious imagery and the
slogan "This is a God-fearing state." 31 The government might offer plausible
(1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (same).
This peculiar feature of the establishment clause gave rise to arguments that the clause, unlike
the free exercise clause and other protections in the Bill of Rights, was not made applicable to the
states through "incorporation" in the fourteenth amendment's guarantee against deprivation of
"liberty" without due process. See, e.g., E. CORWIN. A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR
STATE 114 (1951) (arguing fourteenth amendment protects only religious liberty, not the estab-
lishment of state religion). For whatever reason, it has been well settled since the late 1940s that
the establishment clause does apply to state and local governments. See supra note 17.
128. Moreover, Supreme Court cases "do not require a plaintiff to demonstrate that a govern-
ment action necessarily promotes religion, but simply that it creates . . . a substantial risk [of
promotion]." Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 648 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original) (citations omitted).
129. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
130. Id. at 430.
131. The hypothetical is not far-fetched: the Arizona Republican Party in 1988 adopted as part
of its platform the proposition that the United States is a "Christian nation." It should also be
noted that the Party used in support of its campaign for the "Christian nation" proposition a letter
solicited from Justice O'Connor citing three cases in which the Supreme Court had allegedly
upheld that statement. See, e.g., Gaffney, O'Connor Fumbles 'Christian Nation' Case, CHRISTIAN
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secular purposes for its action: promoting community spirit or acknowledging
community history." 2 Even in this case, no one could show that government's
action had deprived anyone of a specific political right. Yet the establishment
clause must prohibit this action. Since Professor Smith's interpretation of the
clause would not produce a violation in this instance, his view that symbolism
is irrelevant, so long as specific civil rights are preserved, is untenable. 3
Though its structural aspect is paramount, Justice O'Connor's conception
may be expressed in terms of individual interests: a Jeffersonian right against
the government to equal respect for one's opinions on matters of public con-
tern, regardless of one's (ir)religion. 3 The establishment clause may be un-
derstood to reach government action that tends to make a person "feel like an
outsider" because of her non-adherence to the favored religious beliefs. The
clause prevents government from subjecting religious or atheistic minorities to
"greater isolation [and] accentuation of minority status."' 33 In other words,
the clause protects people from feeling alienated from or marginalized in the
political community by government action.136 "Standing in the political com-
munity" thus encompasses not just de jure status but also de facto perceptions
of each person's position in that community."'
CENTURY, April 12, 1989, at 373-75; The "Christian Nation" Controversy, AM. LAW, June 1989,
at 70; Dershowitz, Justice O'Connor's Second Indiscretion, N.Y. Times, April 2, 1989, at E31,
col. 2.
132. Cf Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 782 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(finding use of Latin cross and Spanish motto, translated as "With This We Conquer," on county
seal displayed on police cars and elsewhere "conveys strong impression to the average observer
that Christianity is being endorsed" and thus violates establishment clause, rev'g 528 F. Supp.
919, 924 (D.N.M. 1981) (finding that cross and county seal did not have a primary or principal
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, but were rather "a benign reference to religion").
133. Also, note that the Constitution already provides that "no religious Test shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. VI, § 3. While by its terms this applies only to federal office (and hence did not preclude the
Tennessee statute, discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 118-23), this suggests that the
establishment clause was meant to protect more than concrete, identifiable rights such as of-
ficeholding from interference on religious grounds.
134. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
135. See W. HERBERG, supra note 105, at 255.
136. Constitutional law recognizes "mere" alienation as a harm in other contexts. As Professor
Arnold Loewy has pointed out, the Court has acknowledged the impropriety of sending objection-
able messages to historically disadvantaged groups such as blacks and women. "We refuse to
tolerate segregated railroad cars and courtroom seating because of the discomfort of the message,
not the seats." Loewy, supra note 29, at 1051; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. 1150,
1174-75 (D.R.I. 1981) (Judge Pettine's remarks concerning the alienation produced by govern-
ment's endorsement of religion, quoted supra in the text accompanying note 40), aff'd, 691 F.2d
1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); cf. Smith, supra note 22, at 309 (interpreting
Justice O'Connor's approach as prohibiting "alienation"); id. at 313 ("[A] conception of 'political
standing' that includes a right not to feel like an 'outsider,' constitutes a utopian vision rather than
a realistic basis for formulating constitutional doctrine.").
137. The expansive notion of the establishment clause presented here should not be difficult to
reconcile with current standing doctrine. Cf Smith, supra note 22, at 307 (acknowledging that
laws can endorse religion without altering political status). To meet standing requirements, a
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Preventing this sort of alienation, moreover, may be justified as a prophylac-
tic against more concrete alterations of political standing. Symbolic acts that
seem inconsequential might, cumulatively or over time, foster an atmosphere
of public discourse in which adherence to religion does make a difference. Pro-
fessor Tushnet's arguments that the establishment clause cannot be under-
stood as a first line of defense against violations of religious freedom do not
apply as forcefully here."38 Presumably, a person whose religious beliefs are
sincere and deeply felt will not be easily influenced to abandon those beliefs by
the appearance of government sponsorship of another faith, because such spon-
sorship should be irrelevant to his beliefs. On the other hand, those who con-
sider themselves politically favored by government's endorsement of their reli-
gious affiliation face no similar restraint in excluding the non-favored from
real participation in decisionmaking. Only by recognizing this special potential
for harm can constitutional doctrine remain vigilant against the first thin
wedge of oppression in a particularly delicate area."3 9 "The breach of neutral-
ity that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent
and, in the words of Madison, 'it is proper to take alarm at the first experi-
plaintiff must show an injury in fact that was caused by the allegedly unconstitutional act and the
likelihood that a favorable decision would redress that injury. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38 (1976). See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 107-33. Under Justice O'Connor's ap-
proach, government action need not immediately and directly deprive anyone of an identifiable
political or civil right to violate the establishment clause, and being made to feel "like an out-
sider" or "alienated" may not be an "injury in fact"; "mere psychological injury" is not supposed
to be enough for standing. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-87. But establishment clause
plaintiffs have used other devices to justify standing. For instance, where government funds have
been spent on the allegedly unconstitutional act, taxpayer standing suffices. See Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963); cf.
Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-82 (taxpayer standing limited to "true" spending, exercises of
article I, section 8, clause I spending power). And where the plaintiff alleges that her use of a
public resource has been curtailed, for example, where she finds a religious display on public
grounds so offensive that she alters her route to work to avoid seeing the display, standing is
satisfied. Hewitt v. Joyner, 705 F. Supp. 1443, 1445-46 (C.D. Cal. 1989); see also ACLU v.
Wilkinson, 701 F. Supp. 1296, 1302-03 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (discussion of standing), a.if'd, 895 F.2d
1098 (6th Cir. 1990); Jewish War Veterans of United States v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 3, 9-
11 (D.D.C. 1988) (same). These bases for standing are something of a fiction given the interests
to be protected; perhaps for this reason, the doctrine of standing is given "distinctive treatment" in
establishment clause contexts. Taub v. Kentucky, 842 F.2d 912 (6th Cir. 1988); cf. L. TRIBE,
supra note 52, at 1283 (taxpayer standing does not reflect true nature of interest infringed, which
is not financial but a "fundamental personal right not to be a part of a community whose official
organs endorse religious views that might be fundamentally inimical to one's deepest beliefs").
138. See supra text accompanying note 58.
139. "There are no differences in degree of the denial of constitutionally protected liberties and
no governmental act can be approved on the ground that it is only a little bit unconstitutional."
Citizens Concerned for the Separation of Church & State v. City of Denver, 481 F. Supp. 522,
527 (D. Colo. 1979) (preliminary injunction granted), appeal dismissed, 628 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir.
1980) (lower court judgment vacated for lack of jurisdiction; insufficient evidence in record re-
garding plaintiffs' standing).
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ment on our liberties.' ",140
Professor Tushnet also errs in equating perceptions of exclusion derived
from government endorsement of religion with "the disappointment felt by ev-
eryone who has lost a fair fight in the arena of politics."" ' The establishment
clause dictates that if government endorses religion, the fight is not "fair";
government endorsement of religion simply has no place in the arena. As Jus-
tice Jackson wrote, "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal prin-
ciples to be applied by the courts."'" 2
The no endorsement test thus serves the purpose of the establishment clause
by prohibiting government from sending messages that alter political standing
on the basis of religion. But as Professor Smith points out, governments are
constantly in action, often in areas that may be perceived to affect religion,
and in acting they inevitably send messages that alienate some people on reli-
gious grounds:1 4 3
Ultimately, a degree of alienation must be acknowledged as an inevitable
cost of maintaining government in a pluralistic culture. In such a culture,
some beliefs must, but not all beliefs can, achieve recognition and ratifica-
tion in the nation's laws and public policies; and those whose positions are
not so favored will sometimes feel like outsiders."'
If the no endorsement test is to work at all, it should provide a coherent means
140. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (quoting Madison, supra
note 59, at 82 para. 3).
141. See supra text accompanying note 125.
142. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943), quoted in School
Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). Moreover, in terms of the pluralist
political bargaining model, the fight is not fair because the lines dividing one religious group from
another are relatively frozen. In religious matters, today's political losers (such as Jehovah's Wit-
nesses at the time of Barnette, or Native Americans) have no realistic hope of winning tomorrow.
143. Smith also argues that a prohibition against alienating messages would be hopelessly im-
practical. Government cannot act without expressing judgments and thus sending messages about
beliefs, religious and otherwise, and the religious diversity in this country ensures that at least
some persons may be alienated by many of those messages. A proscription against alienation
would, therefore, bring government to a halt. Moreover, in some cases, government will alienate
people on the basis of religion whichever way it acts. The "no alienation" rule would then be
useless as a guide to judicial decisionmaking. Smith, supra note 22, at 310-13.
The evidentiary standards proposed in Part V(A) below could help to prevent unsubstantiated
claims of alienation from incapacitating government. Furthermore, as discussed in Part V(B) be-
low, a balancing test can be used to save legitimate government action from unwarranted estab-
lishment clause veto.
More significantly, that some government action will necessarily produce some alienation does
not mean that the ideal articulated by Justice O'Connor should be abandoned. It simply means
that the ideal cannot be achieved absolutely. The establishment clause can still be applied in many
cases to ensure that governments avoid sending messages endorsing or disapproving religion.
Where this is not possible, the establishment clause would compel governments to act in the least
alienating or divisive way. See infra notes 216-63 and accompanying text.
144. Smith, supra note 22, at 313.
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of determining which messages are impermissible. Justice O'Connor imple-
ments her test by asking whether government's action would appear to an "ob-
jective observer" to endorse religion. Part IV criticizes that approach. Part V
offers an alternative that more effectively promotes the ideal of political stand-
ing which Justice O'Connor has identified.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE "OBJECTIVE OBSERVER" AS A TEST OF
ENDORSEMENT
Justice O'Connor ascertains whether government has endorsed religion by
using the perspective of the "objective" or "reasonable" observer.1' 5 Unfortu-
nately, her approach rests on a flawed philosophy of language, fails to enhance
doctrinal consistency or coherence, and, by ignoring actual perceptions of en-
dorsement, disregards "outsiders"-those most in need of the protection that
the no endorsement test offers. This Part first addresses Justice O'Connor's
underlying theory of meaning. It then unmasks the "objective observer" as an
unsuccessful attempt to rectify the jurisprudence of the establishment clause.
Whether government action sends a message of "endorsement or disap-
proval" depends on the action's meaning. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 4" Justice
O'Connor offers her theory of meaning. She confines her exposition to the ex-
ample of verbal utterances, although she acknowledges at one point that gov-
ernment may "'speak[ ]' by word or deed."" 7 In her view, "[t]he meaning of
a statement to its audience depends both on the intention of the speaker and
on the 'objective' meaning of the statement in the community."'" Some listen-
ers will be able to gauge the speaker's intent by placing the "words them-
selves" in the "context" of the statement or the speaker's explanation of her
words. Others, without access to evidence of intent beyond the "words them-
selves," will "inevitably receive a message determined by the 'objective' con-
tent of the statement. . . . For them the message actually conveyed may be
145. Justice O'Connor formulated her theory in terms of the "objective observer," see infra
notes 146-97 and accompanying text, and used that concept in her next several establishment
clause opinions. See supra note 44. More recently, she has tended to use the phrase "reasonable
observer." See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086,
3123 (1989) ("reasonable observer"); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 493 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("reasonable
observer").
146. 465 U.S. 668 (1983).
147. Id. at 690 (Justice O'Connor's quotation marks). This focus on words is somewhat curious,
since the very case in which this theory appears, Lynch, involved a nonverbal symbol: a creche.
Indeed, nonverbal symbolic acts have been at issue in many recent establishment clause cases.
See, e.g., Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1985) (county seal
depicting a cross at issue). It is unclear whether aid to parochial school cases should be read as
verbal (the statute or regulation permitting and defining the aid) or nonverbal (the practice of
assistance) action. It is possible that the verbal model of symbolic action more readily allows
Justice O'Connor to draw the line described below between "the objective content" of the message
itself and the meaning of the message in context, because verbal acts may seem to her more
amenable to self-contained definition.
148. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690.
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something not actually intended. '149 Meaning may thus derive either from a
combination of words and other evidence or from words alone.
Consider first the second aspect of Justice O'Connor's theory-of meaning:
the theory that "words themselves" have an "objective" content that uniquely
determines what listeners understand. This notion flies in the face of leading
contemporary theories of language and communication.1 50 The messages that
words convey to a'community depend on the contexts in which the community
members receive the words."' 1 To say that the audience may not be fully ac-
quainted with the context that the speaker had in mind is not to say that the
audience receives a message without context. To some extent, of course,
speaker and audience must share a context, a sense of what the words may
mean; otherwise, communication would not be possible at all.' 52 But the con-
texts may differ, and in that case what the audience understands is not deter-
mined by the words alone, but by something the audience itself brings to the
communicative act: the relations between those words and other things the
audience knows and believes.' "3
Turning to the first prong of Justice O'Connor's theory of meaning, it is
intuitively appealing that the meaning of a statement to its audience should
derive, at least in part, from what the speaker intended to convey.' 54 Problems
arise, however, in the application of this premise to government behavior and
its interpretation by the political community. The governmental actor may not
"intend" his behavior to communicate any particular message at all. 55 More-
149. Id. (quotation marks in original).
150. See S. CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 11-12 (1969) (explicit meaning of
words in natural language never exhausts what is meant by the words). See generally L.
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 21e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 1953) (meaning
depends on use in language).
151. Keep in mind that the concern here is not simply with what the words mean, but with
"what is meant by" those words. The listener's perceptions may play a much larger role in the
latter. For instance, think of a statute providing certain benefits to nonpublic schools, including
parochial schools. Members of the community could- agree on much of the meaning of the statu-
tory language itself, such as which institutions qualify for aid, how the aid is to be distributed,
etcetera, without reaching a consensus on whether those words conveyed a message of endorse-
ment of religion.
152. See S. CAVELL, supra note 150, at 33 ("[T]he primary fact of natural language is that it
is something spoken, spoken together. Talking together is acting together, not making motions and
noises at one another ...."); see also R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 63-64 (1986) (participants in
discourse must "agree about a great deal" in order to meaningfully interact in society).
153. Moreover, does it make sense to divide the public, as Justice O'Connor does, into two
distinct camps: listeners with thorough access to the context of the message, and others who hear
the statement completely outside of its context? Or is it more likely that members of the public
range along a continuum of various degrees of familiarity with one or more of the statement's
many contexts, standing in different and unstable relationships to the speaker?
154. Dependence on the speaker's or author's intent as a guide to meaning itself presupposes
some interpretive strategy that makes that intent relevant. See, e.g., D. RICHARDS, supra note 73,
at 33-45 (criticizing Raoul Berger's narrow intentionalism as a method of constitutional interpre-
tation); R. DWORKIN, supra note 152, at 53-62 (1986) (discussing relationship of artistic and
constructive interpretation).
155. Cf Smith, supra note 22, at 286-88.
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over, identifying a unitary intent behind any government "utterance" is highly
problematic, since most governmental activity is the product of the actions of
many individuals, at least some of whom may intend different things and no
one of whom need intend the final action. Long-standing debates over inten-
tionalism in constitutional interpretation illustrate this difficulty. 56
Justice O'Connor might attempt to meet the objection that the statement's
meaning to its audience cannot depend on the speaker's intent where the audi-
ence cannot precisely identify that intent. She might posit that, in the absence
of unambiguous evidence of the speaker's intent, the speaker will be held to
have intended to convey what those words or actions normally convey. 5 ' A
similar idea, for instance, supports the determination of an "objective" mean-
ing in the "objective theory" of contract. 5
Yet this effort to save the "intended message" aspect of Justice O'Connor's
theory of meaning fails for the same reason as does the "words themselves"
prong: it ignores the audience's role in the creation of meaning, and the fact
that in the actual community meaning is often controversial. To identify
"what is normally conveyed" to the community by government action is not
necessarily to fix a single, "normative" meaning. What is normally conveyed
may well be a variety of messages to different audiefices. Justice O'Connor's
error is ironic in light of the central purpose of the establishment clause, as
contrasted to at least one fundamental goal of contract law. In contract cases,
courts must at some point charge parties with knowledge of the meaning ordi-
narily conveyed by acts like theirs so that "business transactions may proceed
with confidence." '59 There is no interest in protecting diverse interpretations
156. See, e.g.. P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 9-11 (1982) (discussing difficulty of using
historical analysis to determine framers' intent); R. DWORKIN, supra note 152, at 359-65 (discuss-
ing historicism as a means of determining framers' intent); L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 323 (1988) (discussing difficulties with original intent analysis); Brest,
The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 209-17 (1980)
(discussing intentionalism school of interpretation); Tushnet, The U.S. Constitution and the Intent
of the Framers, 36 BUFFALO L. REV. 217, 219-22 (1987) (discussing original intent analysis). Due
to the generality of the language to be construed, the changes in society in the intervening centu-
ries, and the incompleteness of relevant historical records, attempting to discern an "original in-
tent" to guide constitutional interpretation is even more futile than trying to identify the
"speaker's intent" behind government's current acts.
157. See Grice, Meaning, in PROBLEMS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 251-59 (T. Olshew-
sky ed. 1969).
158. The "objective theory" of contract law focuses on what a person's conduct may reasonably
be taken to mean rather than on the person's later assertion of a contrary intent. Hence, a court
may bind a party to an agreement, despite later assertions that no meeting of the minds was
reached, because that party knew or had reason to know of the other party's intention and under-
standing. This determination is based in part on the linguistic usages of other people in similar
cases. A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 106, at 474-77 (1963). The "objective" meaning of
the parties' communications thus determined is not an abstract "true" meaning but simply the
meaning that the parties, based on the ordinary interpretation of their acts, will be held to have
intended.
159. A. CORBIN, supra note 158, at 477. It may be argued that contract law protects diversity
by enforcing whatever terms of agreement the parties freely choose, with the result that people
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merely for diversity's sake. The very purpose of the religion clauses, on the
other hand, is to protect minority and even idiosyncratic modes of belief and
understanding.6 Moreover, applying the objective theory of contract does not
threaten to marginalize groups of persons on the basis of their divergence
from the "normal" understanding of words and acts, while the "objective"
interpretation of government's impact on religion has precisely that effect. 6 '
The basic flaw, then, in the theory of meaning in which Justice O'Connor
grounds her "objective observer" is her assumption that there is such a thing
as "[tihe meaning of a statement to its audience." 162 In fact, a message may
have many audiences and many meanings. Justice O'Connor allows that dif-
ferent recipients will interpret a message differently, depending on their access
to evidence of the speaker's intent. Elsewhere she acknowledges that even
those equally familiar, or unfamiliar, with the speaker's explanation for her
words may understand the message in different ways; she describes govern-
ment action endorsing religion as sending one message to adherents and an-
other to nonadherents 65 Yet her theory of meaning locks Justice O'Connor
into holding that only one meaning is constitutionally significant.' 6'
may order their affairs in nonstandard ways. Still, the parties to the contract freely agree to be
bound, and one can hold the other to her promise-and thus give effect to the atypical transac-
tion-only if the meaning of the terms may be fixed for the parties themselves. By contrast, the
diversity that the establishment clause protects is based not on shared meaning, but on differences
in self-conception and belief among the members of the entire political community. The establish-
ment clause must acknowledge those differences, and, in light of them, the clause protects equality
of political standing by imposing on government a duty to avoid making those differences relevant
to citizens' perceptions of themselves and each other as members of the political community.
160. See, e.g., Dorsen & Sims, supra note 25, at 863-64 (primary purpose of religion clauses is
to protect minorities from "untrammelled majorities"); Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 794-95 (1984) (views of minority are as important as
those of majority); Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 98
HARV. L. REV. 592, 610-11 (1985) (criticizing Lynch Court for allowing "society's insiders to
characterize the message the outsiders receive"); Developments in the Law-Religion and the
State, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648 (1987) (application of religion clause must turn on perspec-
tive of the minority); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 HARV. L. REV. 87, 180
n.56, 182-83 & n.68 (1984) (stressing importance of minorities' perceptions in religion clause
cases). Thus, the "average" person should not be the benchmark in establishment clause doctrine.
161. See supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
162. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis
added).
163. Id. at 688.
164. Cf. Justice Brennan's remarks in Allegheny County:
I would not, however, presume to say that my interpretation of the tree's signifi-
cance is the "correct" one, or the one shared by most visitors to the City-County
Building. I do not know how we can decide whether it was the tree that stripped the
religious connotations from the menorah, or the menorah that laid bare the religious
origins of the tree. Both are reasonable interpretations of the scene the city presented,
and thus both, I think, should satisfy Justice Blackmun's requirement that the display
"be judged according to the standard of a 'reasonable observer.' "
County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3127 (1989) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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And which meaning is that? To determine whether "the" meaning of gov-
ernment action is to endorse religion, Justice O'Connor writes, we must ex-
amine both what the government "intended to communicate" by its action and
what message the government "actually conveyed.' 6' But the message in-
tended and the message received are not equal partners in the creation of con-
stitutionally recognized meaning. The intended message, properly understood,
controls. The message "actually conveyed" is ignored.
This sleight of hand is accomplished through the device of the "objective
observer." In Wallace v. Jaffree,1 6 evaluating Alabama's moment-of-silence
law, Justice O'Connor states that "[tihe relevant issue is whether an objective
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of
the statute, would perceive [the government act] as a state endorsement of
[religion] .''67 To plot this onto her theory of meaning, the text, of course,
contains the "words themselves"; the legislative history and implementation of
the statute indicate the speaker's "intent" in the same way as do a speaker's
explanation and the context of the statement. Thus, the single meaning that
the "objective observer" perceives in government's conduct is close, if not iden-
tical, to what Justice O'Connor's theory describes as the intended message.
The "objective observer" is not someone without access to evidence of intent,
who will perceive a message "not actually intended." That real audience of
government messages is ignored. 168
Indeed, by asking how an observer "acquainted with the text, legislative
history, and implementation of the statute" would perceive the government
message, Justice O'Connor indicates that she is not actually concerned with
the perception of the government message by its real audience. In Lynch, for
instance, how many viewers of Pawtucket's creche were familiar with the city
council debates and public pronouncements that preceded its installation? Or,
more strikingly, in Wallace, how many Alabama schoolchildren authorized to
meditate or pray silently were conversant with the legislative history which the
court found so crucial?169 As Professor Smith writes, "the 'objective observer's
165. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
166. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
167. Id. at 76.
168. Smith, supra note 22, at 294, explains very clearly how the "objective observer" focuses
on the intended message and how Justice O'Connor thereby collapses the effect inquiry into the
purpose inquiry. The confusion has recently been perpetuated by Justice Blackmun. See Allegheny
County, 109 S. Ct. at 3102 (Blackmun, J.) (stating that "the question is 'what viewers may fairly
understand to be the purpose of the display .... ") (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,
692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). This Article agrees with Professor Smith's analysis on
this point, but not with his contention that the alternative, to consider the perceptions of real
human beings, "raises insuperable problems." Smith, supra note 22, at 291; see infra notes 199-
215 and accompanying text (explaining why considering the actual understandings of citizens will
not raise insuperable problems).
169. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1984). Ignoring the children who actually participated in
the activities authorized by the statute seems particularly anomalous in light of the Court's usual
solicitude for children's perceptions of government activity. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981) (acknowledging that younger children are highly impressionable and
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perceptions are remarkably unlike those of most real human beings."'7 0 Quite
possibly the only "objective observer" knowledgeable enough to ascertain the
true meaning of the government's message is the judge.' 7 1
Justice O'Connor purports to map her twofold inquiry into the intended and
received meaning of government action onto the purpose and effect prongs of
the Lemon test.' 2 It is unclear whether Justice O'Connor first developed her
no endorsement conception of the establishment clause and the theory of
meaning that supports it, and then discovered that she could present the latter
as a "clarification" of Lemon, or whether she began by trying to squeeze
Lemon into her theory of meaning. But in her reformulation, the Lemon
prongs are no longer separate. She writes that the effect prong of Lemon "asks
whether, irrespective of government's actual purpose, the practice under re-
view conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval." 17 3 Yet, because the
objective observer looks to the "intended" meaning rather than the "objective"
meaning, Justice O'Connor collapses the effect test into the purpose test.' 7'
This reductionism excludes the possibility that a government action aimed at a
permissible purpose may still convey an impermissible meaning to members of
the community. 7 5
that state action must be tailored accordingly); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971)
(same).
170. Smith, supra note 22, at 292-93.
171. Several scholars have remarked that the "objective observer" who found nothing objec-
tionable about Pawtucket's creche in Lynch obviously did not consider the views of the Jews and
other "outsiders" whom the establishment clause is presumably designed to protect. See, e.g., L.
TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1292-94 (criticizing the Lynch Court's use of the majority's perspective,
not the minority's); Tribe, supra note 160, at 611 (analogizing Lynch to separate but equal juris-
prudence that upheld Jim Crow laws); Tushnet, supra note 58, at 711-12 & n.52 (finding it
"difficult to believe that the Lynch majority would have reached the same result had there been a
Jew on the Court to speak from the heart about what public displays of creches really mean to
Jews"); Van Alstyne, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Com-
ment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 781-87 (criticizing the Lynch Court's "religious
insensitivity").
172. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
173. Id. (emphasis added).
174. See Smith, supra note 22, at 293-94. It is ironic that Justice O'Connor uses the word
"objective" to describe her second sense of what a message "means" and then ignores that second
sense in formulating what an "objective" observer understands.
175. The converse is not a problem because the government action violates the establishment
clause regardless of effect if the purpose is impermissible. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578 (1987) (Louisiana act providing that public schools spend equal time teaching creation-
ism and evolution had no credible secular purpose).
Professor Smith scoffs at the notion that unintended endorsement of religion should be constitu-
tionally suspect: "[a] doctrine which formally adopted misinformation and misperceptions as the
standard for determining the constitutionality of a potentially broad array of public measures
would seem, to put it mildly, anomalous." Smith, supra note 22, at 290. Labelling alternative
perceptions as "misperceptions" is precisely the mistake that Justice O'Connor implicitly makes
by using the "objective observer" to preclude those alternative perceptions. Cf County of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3132 n.10 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that:
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
In Lynch, Justice O'Connor illustrates this process by inferring the absence
of any endorsement of religion from the supposed predominance of secular
purposes. She writes that
legislative prayers . . . , government declaration of Thanksgiving as a public
holiday, printing "In God We Trust" on coins, and opening court sessions
with "God save the United States and this honorable court" . . . serve...
the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing
confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy
of appreciation in society. For that reason, and because of their history and
ubiquity, those practices are not understood as conveying government ap-
proval of particular religious beliefs.1 '
Conversely, in Wallace, Justice O'Connor infers endorsement of religion
from the lack of a secular purpose. In that case, she agreed with the majority
that the Alabama statute prescribing a moment of silence "for meditation or
prayer" at the beginning of the school day was intended to convey an imper-
missible message endorsing prayer, since Alabama had already passed a stat-
ute providing for a moment of silent meditation. She acknowledged that
"[wlhile it is ... unnecessary also to determine the effect of the statute ... it
also seems likely that the message actually conveyed to objective observers by
[section] 16-1-20.1 is approval of the child who selects prayer over other alter-
natives during a moment of silence."' 77 This statement makes sense only if the
"objective observers," like Justice O'Connor herself, concluded that the stat-
ute's legislative history implied an impermissible purpose.
Justice O'Connor further explains the standard for determining the meaning
of government action as follows:
[Wihether a government activity communicates endorsement of religion is
[tlhis case illustrates the danger that governmental displays of religious symbols may
give rise to unintended divisiveness, for the net result of the Court's disposition is to
disallow the display of the creche but to allow the display of the menorah. Laypersons
unfamiliar with the intricacies of Establishment Clause jurisprudence may reach the
wholly unjustified conclusion that the Court itself' is preferring one faith over
another.").
In this connection, it is also important to observe that "an individual's intentions or wishes can
no more produce the general meaning for a word than they can produce horses for beggars, or
home runs from pop flies, or successful poems out of unsuccessful poems." That is, " 'X means
YZ' .. . holds or fails to hold, whatever I wish to mean. And 'I mean by X, YZ,' where meaning
does depend on me, is performative; something I am doing to the word X, not something I am
wishing about it." S. CAVELL, supra note 150, at 38-39. While Professor Cavell's reference to "the
general meaning" of a word does not strictly apply to the present analysis, the basic point does.
The meaning of a word in the community of speakers is based on how the members of the commu-
nity, including, but not limited to, the speaker, use and understand the word. The speaker's con-
trary intention by itself does not change that.
176. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's statement of the
holding also conflates the two inquiries: "Pawtucket's display of its creche, I believe, does not
communicate a message that the government intends to endorse the Christian beliefs represented
by the creche." Id. at 692.
177. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 78 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1990]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
not a question of simple historical fact. Although evidentiary submissions
may help answer it, the question is, like the question whether racial or sex-
based classifications communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal
question to be answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social
facts."'
Thus, the "objective" or "reasonable" observer is, in the final analysis, the
judiciary. Evidence of actual perceptions of government messages by members
of the community "may help" determine whether government action endorses
religion, but clearly are not essential. 179 Justice O'Connor's method directs at-
tention away from the actual impact of government action on the real commu-
nity. Other judges following her approach have on occasion been quite cavalier
in their dismissal of citizens' genuine perceptions of endorsement, calling them
"hypersensitive" and "fastidious." °80 But this makes perfect sense if what mat-
ters is the message supposedly intended rather than the messages actually
received. 8 '
What does Justice O'Connor hope to accomplish by having the "objective"
or "reasonable" observer implement her no endorsement principle? One possi-
bility is that the appeal to objectivity is meant to forestall charges of
178. Id. at 76.
179. Id.; cf. ACLU v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d 1561, 1570 (Nelson, J., dissenting) ("The
record before us is not particularly illuminating, nor should we expect it to be."). The dissent also
quoted the Lynch Court's statement that "the question is in large part a legal question to be
answered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts." Id. at 1570 (quoting Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
180. Hewitt v. Joyner, 705 F. Supp. 1443, 1450 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (In a case where plaintiffs
contested a public park's collection of biblical statues and tableaus, the court found that "[aln
objective person would not draw such an inference [of endorsement]. I must lay this accusation
only to the hypersensitive views of persons who are 'looking under the rocks' for a cause of com-
plaint."); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City of Denver, 526 F. Supp.
1310, 1315 (D. Colo. 1981) (where plaintiffs sought to enjoin city and county from displaying a
nativity scene, the court determined that "[t]he First Amendment does not require the preroga-
tives of government be limited by the sensibilities of its most sensitive or fastidious citizens.").
181. Justice O'Connor's definition of the inquiry as a "legal question" for "judicial interpreta-
tion" may not be as well supported by other doctrines as she may believe. The equal protection
cases, upon which Justice O'Connor seeks to base her method of determining the content of gov-
ernment messages in establishment clause disputes, do not provide a precise analogy. Whether
suspect classifications communicate an "invidious message" depends on whether they are justified
by a compelling governmental purpose (such as actual relevant differences between the classes).
That is, racial classifications are assumed to communicate an invidious message if they burden an
historically disadvantaged class unless they are shown to be necessary to promote a compelling
governmental purpose. The test for gender-based classifications is similar: they are assumed to
communicate an invidious message unless they bear a substantial relationship to an important
governmental purpose. 2 R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 18.5, at 363, § 18.20, at 522 (1986). This is plainly different from measuring the effect of
a message independently of its purpose, as Justice O'Connor purports to be doing in the establish-
ment clause context. In the equal protection cases, it seems appropriate for a judge to gauge
whether government action is sufficiently related to a proper purpose. The meaning of a message,
however, by Justice O'Connor's own theory, ought to be determined by its effect on its recipients.
Her method arrogates this function to the judge.
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countermajoritarianism. If the court must determine meaning, a valid determi-
nation cannot represent merely the individual judges' subjective interpretations
and personal value judgments. It must be grounded in another source of au-
thority, namely, an "objective" science of meaning. 82
Another possibility is that if the meaning of government messages-and
thus the resolution of establishment clause disputes--can be determined "ob-
jectively," then perhaps the pattern of results of those disputes will be more
coherent and predictable.18 In Allegheny County, Justice O'Connor writes
that she "remain[s] convinced that the endorsement test is capable of consis-
tent application."' 84 But as at least one commentator has explained, the objec-
tive observer method provides no guidance at all:
Whether an observer would "perceive" an accommodation [of religion] as
"endorsement of a particular religious belief' depends entirely on the ob-
server's view of the proper relation between church and state .... An objec-
tive observer holding separationist views of the First Amendment might be
quick to perceive government's contact with religion as endorsement; one
following [an accommodationist approach] might have a different reaction.
Looking to an "objective observer" cannot substitute for a constitutional
standard. Such a formulation serves merely to avoid stating what considera-
tions inform the judgment that a statute is constitutional or unconstitu-
tional. If Justice O'Connor's "objective observer" standard were adopted by
the courts, we would know nothing more than that judges will decide cases
the way they think they should be decided. 88
Has the "objective" or "reasonable" observer test actually enhanced the
consistency and predictability of religion clause adjudication? Perhaps unsur-
prisingly for a "chancellor's foot" standard, no one has yet discerned any such
effect. Other Justices have applied Justice O'Connor's no endorsement test and
reached conflicting results.' Indeed, one commentator who has championed
her approach has noted that its consistent application would invalidate many
cases approving symbolic aid to religion, and possibly some approving financial
aid as well.' 87 Whatever the value of consistency in religion clause cases, 88
182. Richard Sherwin observes that in the context of the law of confessions, Justice O'Connor
also purports to adopt a "scientific" approach. Sherwin, Law, Violence, and Illiberal Belief (forth-
coming article in the Georgetown Law Journal).
183. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
184. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3120 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (observing that three federal
circuit courts considering challenges to creches standing alone at city halls all found impermissible
messages of endorsement).
185. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. I, 48.
186. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1983) (Justice Brennan's interpretation of
message conveyed differed from Justice O'Connor's); see supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text
(discussing Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct 3086 (1989)); see also Redlich, Separation of Church
and State: The Burger Court's Tortuous Journey, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1094, 1124, 1146-47
(1985) (Justice O'Connor's Lynch concurrence has been quoted freely by other Justices in subse-
quent cases to justify conclusions she does not agree with).
187. Loewy, supra note 29, at 1055-60. Justice O'Connor herself writes that the tax exemptions
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Justice O'Connor's "clarification" has failed to achieve it.
More importantly, the pseudo-objectivity of the "objective" observer hides
the balance of interests that actually produces establishment clause hold-
ings."' This concealment is most blatant in cases in which the establishment
clause appears to conflict with the free exercise clause. In Wallace, discussing
the purpose test, Justice O'Connor notes that "[i]t is disingenuous to look for a
purely secular purpose when the manifest objective of a statute is to facilitate
the free exercise of religion by lifting a government-imposed burden."' 90 In-
stead, according to Justice O'Connor, "the Court should simply acknowledge
that the religious purpose of such a statute is legitimated by the Free Exercise
Clause."'' But when Justice O'Connor turns to the effect of government ac-
tion, she writes:
In assessing . . . whether the statute [lifting a government-imposed burden
on free exercise] conveys the message of endorsement of religion or a partic-
ular religious belief-courts should assume that the "objective observer"...
is acquainted with the Free Exercise Clause and the values it promotes.
Thus individual perceptions, or resentment that a religious observer is ex-
empted from a particular government requirement, would be entitled to lit-
tle weight.if the free exercise clause strongly supported the exemption.' 9'
Justice O'Connor thus fails to acknowledge frankly the balancing process she
employs in the effect prong, even though she is willing to acknowledge it in
applying the purpose prong.'93
The very form of Justice O'Connor's inquiry obscures the balancing of inter-
ests. By asking whether government communicates a message of endorsement
for religious, educational, and charitable organizations upheld in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970), the mandatory Sunday closing law upheld in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420
(1961), and the released time program for off-campus religious instruction approved in Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), all failed the "primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion"
test under which they were decided, but did not violate the establishment clause because they did
not communicate a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Lynch, 465
U.S. at 691-92.
188. Johnson, supra note 22, at 839 (arguing that inconsistency is not a flaw because it allows
the Supreme Court to help keep the peace through compromise).
189. See infra notes 216-63 and accompanying text; Dorsen & Sims, supra note 25, at 858-60;
see also L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 792-93 (discussing balancing in other first amendment areas).
190. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 83 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
191. Id..
192. Id.
193. See also Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (application of § 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
exempts religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against religious discrimination in
employment, to Mormon Church's secular, nonprofit gymnasium did not violate establishment
clause). In Amos, Justice O'Connor, rather than admit the possibility that free exercise accommo-
dations might actually and reasonably be perceived as endorsements, yet be constitutionally valid
because the Court deliberately decides to balance free exercise and establishment clause interests
and favors the former if the two irreconcilably conflict, simply said that there was no endorsement
at all-at least none that the objective observer would perceive. Id. at 349 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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or disapproval, she seeks a yes or no answer. The message is either permissible
or impermissible. This inquiry, however, is less flexible than the "principal or
primary effect" prong of Lemon, and the cases that follow that test.19 4 In those
cases, effects advancing or inhibiting religion were tolerated so long as they
were indirect or remote. In Lynch itself, Chief Justice Burger admitted argu-
endo that the creche "advances religion in a sense," but concluded that the
benefit was indirect, remote, and incidental. 195 While the line between "pri-
mary" or "direct and substantial" on the one hand, and "remote or indirect"
on the other, was impossible to fix on a principled basis, at least courts could
acknowledge that the question was one of degree. By contrast, Justice
O'Connor poses a question that requires a categorical response. The conse-
quence is highly unfortunate: conflicting categorical answers to similar ques-
tions create the appearance of greater conflict of principle, and even absurdity,
than do different judgments of degree.
In sum, while Justice O'Connor's no endorsement principle offers an impor-
tant insight into the purposes of the establishment clause, the "objective" or
"reasonable" observer standard which determines endorsement lacks support
in a sound theory of meaning and fails to serve its intended doctrinal goals of
consistent and coherent decisionmaking. Most significantly, Justice O'Connor's
perspective prevents the no endorsement principle from fulfilling what should
be its primary function by allowing the court to ignore outsiders' perceptions
of government endorsement of religion."'
Can the no endorsement concept be employed to enhance religious freedom
and political community? Is Professor Tribe correct in asserting that Justice
O'Connor has "asked the right question," but occasionally produced the wrong
answer?.97 Who should decide whether government action sends an impermis-
sible message, if not the "objective observer"? The task is to devise a workable
method that takes account of the actual perceptions in the community, espe-
cially those of "outsiders," without requiring the invalidation of a valuable
government program simply because some person claims to perceive it as an
endorsement or disapproval of religion. Part V proposes such a method.
V. A REVISED METHOD: WEIGHING ACTUAL PERCEPTIONS OF
ENDORSEMENT AGAINST GOVERNMENT'S SECULAR PURPOSES
The establishment clause can recognize the actual perceptions of individuals
who claim to be adversely affected by government action that implicates reli-
194. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973) (acknowledging
that the principal or primary effect prong allows aid that "indirectly and incidentally" promotes a
school's religious function).
195. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1983).
196. It is thus especially ironic that Professor Tribe should write that "the perspective of an
objective observer, able to step back from the conventional understanding of the majority 'and to
comprehend the viewpoint of the minority, is particularly important." L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at
1225.
197. Id. at 1225 n.71.
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
gion. Courts should permit government activity perceived to endorse or to dis-
approve of religion to survive challenge only if government can show that the
activity is strongly related, if not necessary, to an important secular objec-
tive." This method would neither overload the trial courts nor frustrate gov-
ernmental efforts to achieve important secular goals. Moreover, by command-
ing government to listen to all of the people for whose protection the
establishment clause is designed, the jurisprudence of the clause will compel
greater intellectual honesty and greater respect for the ideal of equal political
standing.
The first section below suggests that, in determining the meaning of a mes-
sage for establishment clause purposes, courts may be guided by a similar in-
quiry in another area of law: whether a statement has a defamatory meaning.
The second section indicates how the courts might assess perceptions of gov-
ernmental endorsement of religion in light of the purposes served by the gov-
ernment action giving rise to those perceptions.
A. The "Meaning(s) of a Message" in the Law of Defamation
A number of establishment clause decisions have referred to evidence of
how members of the community actually understood the meaning of govern-
ment action.199 The ultimate standard for defining endorsement, however, has
remained an abstraction: the "objective" or "reasonable" or "average" ob-
server.2"' Only one opinion has explicitly posed alternatives to the objective
standard. In that opinion, a federal district court considered an actual percep-
tions test but eventually applied a test much like the "objective observer."' 0°
198. See infra notes 216-63 and accompanying text.
199. See, e.g., Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 781 (10th Cir. 1985)
(plaintiffs presented "highly persuasive evidence" that county "advertised" Catholicism through
its county seal); Jewish War Veterans of United States v. United States, 695 F. Supp. I, 8
(D.D.C. 1988) (plaintiff altered travel routes to avoid seeing large illuminated cross on naval base
because it made him feel like an "alien"); Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State
v. City of Denver, 526 F. Supp. 1310, 1314-15 (D. Colo. 1981) (plaintiffs introduced psychologi-
cal study of Jewish school children, assessing whether they could make a distinction between reli-
gious and nonreligious symbols).
200. See, e.g., Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 493 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that "[n]o reasonable observer is likely to draw from the facts
before us an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belier'); Friedman
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 781, 782 (10th Cir. 1985) (en banc) ("average
observer" standard); McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 1984) ("reasonable person"
standard); Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 700 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D. Vt. 1988) ("objectively
reasonable" standard), rev'd, 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990).
201. In Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin
the city and county of Denver from displaying a nativity scene, paid for with public funds, which
was part of an annual Christmas lighting display at the main municipal building in downtown
Denver. The trial court granted the injunction. 481 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D. Colo. 1979). On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit dismissed and remanded with instructions to vacate for lack of jurisdiction
because the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence of standing. 628 F.2d 1289, 1297-98
(10th Cir. 1980). The plaintiffs sued again, having corrected the jurisdictional defect. Plaintiff's
motion for a preliminary injunction was denied. 508 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1981). A different
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The "objective observer," Professor Smith writes, may be explained as a
judge later modified this decision to deny the preliminary injunction. This new judge held that the
nativity scene did not violate the establishment clause. 526 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1981).
In the first action, the district court followed Lemon and Nyquist in asking whether the nativity
scene had a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. "Convincing and uncontroverted
evidence," including testimony of non-Christian or nonreligious witnesses who felt "left out" by
the display, and letters and petitions from the display's supporters, led the court to conclude that
the scene's primary effect was on the religious sensibilities of the public: that the scene was
"widely viewed as an affirmation and support of the tenets of the Christian faith." 481 F. Supp. at
529.
In the second action, the plaintiffs explicitly argued that the nativity scene violated the estab-
lishment clause because members of the community viewed it "as the City's endorsement of the
religious content of the nativity scene." 508 F. Supp. at 828. The court attempted to fit the deter-
mination of endorsement into the framework of Lemon and Nyquist:
[An endorsement by the City of a particular faith through the display of a religious
symbol could have a direct and immediate effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.
The problem arises in determining whether the City's use of a nativity scene as part
of a larger display constitutes such an endorsement: Is the test whether the court,
viewing the matter objectively, perceives such an endorsement, or should the court be
governed by the subjective perceptions of the scene's viewers? If the test is subjective,
the issue is one of degree: How broadly must an endorsement of religion by the City
be perceived before the religious effect becomes "direct and immediate"?
526 F. Supp. at 1312.
Both parties recommended a perceiver-based test, not a judge-based one. Plaintiff argued that
"if any reasonable person perceives the display as an endorsement by the City of the Christian
faith," an impermissible effect would be proven. Id. Defendant argued that "the consensus of the
viewers must perceive the impermissible endorsement" before the establishment clause would be
violated. Id.
The court rejected both approaches. Requiring a consensus "does not provide adequate protec-
tion for members of the community who endorse a faith (or lack of faith) other than that of the
majority." Id. The court continued:
[lI]t seems equally clear that the City does not directly advance or inhibit religion
merely because a reasonable person or indeed a group of reasonable people perceive
the City's display as an endorsement of religion. Reasonable people . . . can find
endorsement by the government of religion in ceremonies and traditions that the Su-
preme Court has stated . . . do not violate the First Amendment.
Id. (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-13 (1952)). The court purported to combine the
tests:
First, the court must determine in light of all the evidence in the case whether the
message conveyed ... is one of endorsement of religion. Secondly, . . . the court must
assess the reasonableness of th[e] perception [that the display endorses Christianity]
in light of the nature of the symbol involved, the circumstances of its use, and the
number of viewers who are likely to share that perception.
Id. at 1312-13.
The court then reviewed the evidence, including letters and petitions to the city from supporters
of the display and expert psychological evidence on the effect of the display on non-Christian
children. "In attempting to objectively view the display in its context the court concludes that the
message conveyed is not an endorsement by the City of the Christian faith, but rather one of
general celebration of the holiday season." Id. at 1315. While evidence indicated that a number of
local citizens, both Christians and non-Christians, perceived it as an endorsement of Christianity,
"[iut has not been shown that that perception is so broad or inevitable that a direct and immediate
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion results." Id. The court added: "The First Amendment
does not require the prerogatives of government be limited by the sensibilities of its most sensitive
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device to avoid the "insuperable" problems that recognizing actual perceptions
would pose.2 2 If the perceptions of the majority are the only ones that count,
then the establishment clause poses no real obstacle to symbolic endorsement
of the majority's religion. But allowing anyone to claim alienation from a per-
ceived government endorsement of religion would be unworkable because al-
most every government action will alienate someone on religious grounds.203
Yet using the actual understandings of citizens to determine whether gov-
ernment action conveys a message of endorsement of religion does not present
insuperable obstacles. Basic tort law requires just such an analysis to ascertain
whether the meaning of a statement is defamatory. While the definition of
"defamatory" is of course quite different from that of "endorsing religion,"
the analytical similarity is substantial. Both tests assess the impact of a state-
ment on a person's standing in the community: in the law of defamation, the
standing of the object of the statement; in the establishment clause, as read by
Justice O'Connor, the standing of at least some of the recipients of the mes-
sage, who may or may not also be the objects of the message.
Defamation law is most useful in providing the standard for determining the
or fastidious citizens." Id.; see Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313, quoted in 508 F. Supp. at 830 (decision
on preliminary injunction).
The opinion is perplexing. The test adopted by the court is an awkward hybrid. First, the court
is to determine whether the message conveyed by the creche "is" endorsement of religion. The
"is" suggests an absolutist judgment by the court. This judgment, however, is to be made "in light
of all the evidence." But how does this fit with the court's second step: to assess the reasonableness
of the perception of endorsement by some reasonable people? Since the court determined "objec-
tively" that there was no message of endorsement, then why bother gauging the extent of the
actual perception of endorsement? Is the requirement that the perception of endorsement be
"broad and inevitable" an implicit acknowledgment that such perceptions were "reasonable," but
with the insistence that more is required to violate the establishment clause? Ultimately, though
Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State raises the possibility of a perceiver-based
standard for the establishment clause, the case does not clearly illustrate that such a test is viable.
202. Smith, supra note 22, at 291-92; see also Ingber, supra note 79, at 325. Professor Ingber
writes that the national community, not an individual or small local group, must define "religion"
for purposes of the establishment clause. Id. Otherwise, persons with odd views of religion could
prevent government from promoting certain values in the schools on the ground that such values
represented a "religious" viewpoint. Id. Moreover, local definitions of religion would result in "a
constitutional balkanizing inconsistent with our traditional view of the Constitution as a unifying
symbol." Id. In this connection, Professor Ingber praises Justice O'Connor's "objective observer"
because it "helps to limit the establishment clause's impact." Id. at 325 & nn. 575-76.
The response to Professor Ingber's first point, regarding the need for a national definition of
religion, is the assessment of values prescribed infra notes 216-63 and accompanying text. The
response to the second point, the impact of regional balkanization, is that even under current
doctrine, two local governments may act similarly, yet only one arouse opposition based on the
establishment clause. In that case the nation will feature a "balkanization" of behaviors, which
seems altogether appropriate. If lawsuits arise in both situations, each court must persuade itself
that the perceptions of endorsement are sincere; if so, presumably the courts will balance govern-
mental interests similarly, and if they do not, the Supreme Court, if it wishes to declare nationally
applicable doctrine, may attempt to do so by mandating a certain weighing of values in a particu-
lar type of case.
203. See Smith, supra note 22, at 312.
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message's meaning. In defamation law, as opposed to the law of obscenity, for
instance, "community standards" or the "average observer" do not necessarily
rule.2"4 In a defamation case, "liability is not a question of majority vote. 20 5
Rather, "[i]t is enough that the communication would tend to prejudice [its
object] in the eyes of a substantial and respectable 'minority" of the commu-
nity.20 6 While defamation is not "a question of the existence of some individ-
ual or individuals with views sufficiently peculiar to regard as derogatory what
the vast majority of persons regard as innocent," neither does it depend on the
views of "right-thinking people."207 Indeed, "if the plaintiff's reputation is in-
jured in the eyes of a segment of the community whose views cannot be said to
be totally irrational or lawless, the courts should give redress against the
inju ry . '208
The basis for this standard is the real injury to reputation that can result
from minority perceptions:
The law of defamation is, by its very nature, a limitation on free speech and
freedom of the press-a limitation necessary to ensure certain highly prized
interests of individuals in their reputation and standing among their fellows.
But their fellows will necessarily be people of differing and divergent views.
A rule of law that would limit legal protection to their reputation among
those whose moral standards conformed to those of the majority would seem
contrary to our traditions."0 9
Analogous considerations justify the use of a similar standard for determin-
ing the meaning of messages in establishment clause cases; for "reputation
among those whose moral standards conformed to those of the majority" we
may substitute "the majority's perception of whether the claimant is being
viewed as an outsider." The establishment clause explicitly limits the power of
government in order to protect against symbolic or real disenfranchisement on
religious grounds. The recipients of the messages sent by government action,
like the recipients of allegedly defamatory messages, have divergent perspec-
tives and thus divergent understandings of the messages. Refusing to acknowl-
edge perceptions of endorsement by those outside the majority would be the
same as refusing to acknowledge that a person may be defamed in the eyes of
204. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (community standards govern defi-
nition of obscenity).
205. Peck v. Chicago Tribune, 214 U.S. 185, 190 (Holmes, J.).
206. 2 F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.1, at 25 (2d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter F. HARPER]; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 comment e (1977)
(standard by which defamation is determined is one based on a "substantial and respectable
minority").
207. F. HARPER, supra note 206, at 26; see also Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733
(2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, J.) (statement that attorney was agent for Communist Party was defam-
atory because it could lead people to regard attorney with scorn, etc., even though people who
thought that would be "wrong-thinking").
208. Note, Defamation-Imputation of Sympathy with Communism, 7 ALA. LAW. 347, 349
(1946).
209. F. HARPER, supra note 206, at 26.
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others who do not share the majority's morality, but who are no less fellow
citizens for that.
In one obvious respect, the standard for determining the meaning of a mes-
sage in defamation cases is not purely subjective. The law provides a reference
point outside the claimant: any "segment" of the community whose views are
not "totally irrational." Yet this standard is far closer to a subjective standard
than it is to Justice O'Connor's "objective" or "reasonable" observer, because
it validates a variety of perceptions, while only one viewpoint qualifies as that
of the "objective observer."
In marginal cases, establishment clause doctrine need not recognize "totally
irrational" perceptions, although this "totally irrational" standard should dif-
fer from that used in the defamation context. The plaintiff should be required
to give reasons why she perceives government behavior as an endorsement of
religion. If the underlying constitutional principle is the right of each citizen to
participate equally in political dialogue, it seems appropriate to ask of the es-
tablishment clause plaintiff that she assume the dialogic responsibility of offer-
ing an explanation, but not necessarily a "reasonable" one, for her perception
of harm."'
Any more rigorous screening of viewpoints would defeat the very purpose of
recognizing real perceptions. After all, an individual's perception that govern-
ment has endorsed religion, and thereby "made her feel like an outsider," is
fundamentally subjective: the individual's understanding of her own
(ir)religion and her perception of how the government action has affected her
210. Courts might still consider some perceptions "totally irrational," in the sense of being
grounded in delusional beliefs, and thus dismiss them without putting the government to its bur-
den of persuasion. Suppose, for instance, a complaint that the allowance of a tax deduction for a
contribution to Brown University conveyed a message endorsing religion because Brown was
founded as a Baptist institution. That perception of endorsement might be genuine, but because
Brown has long since had no religious affiliation, it is hard to imagine how the plaintiff could
explain, without recourse to delusional beliefs, that this particular government action endorsed
religion.
On the other hand, suppose a complaint that the city of Corpus Christi (or San Francisco, for
that matter), by retaining that name, impermissibly endorsed Christianity. Here a non-delusional
explanation for the perception of endorsement may readily be imagined: the pervasive official use
of a distinctively Christian name could be taken to indicate government's continuing preference
for Christianity over, say, the culture indicated by a Native American place-name. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, July 7, 1990, at 10, col. I (anti-abortion crusader says he was "called" to Corpus Christi
because the name means "the body of Christ"). This complaint, therefore, should survive sum-
mary dismissal and force the government to articulate reasons justifying its conduct. In all likeli-
hood, the court would decide that retaining the name "Corpus Christi" is worth the risk of aliena-
tion posed by the retention because the city must have some name or another, and the cost and
inefficiency entailed by a name change would be great. Nonetheless, allowing the complaint to go
forward serves the dual purposes of respecting the complainant by forcing government to speak to
her point of view and justify its behavior, and of keeping government open to different viewpoints
which, however odd they may seem (at first), provide a necessary corrective, an occasion for self-
criticism, for government. Cf A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 78 (free speech clause guarantees air-
ing of critical ideas necessary for informed self-government).
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position in the community. 11 Any requirement that perceptions of endorse-
ment and alienation be "reasonable" or "legitimate" or shared by a certain
number of others would represent at least a partial return to an "objective"
perspective and the difficulties that it entails.
Satisfying the burden of proof as to "the meaning of the message" should be
no more difficult for the plaintiff in an establishment clause case than in a
defamation suit. 2 Moreover, just as intent to defame is not ordinarily an ele-
ment of the prima facie defamation claim, so a message of endorsement or
disapproval may be shown regardless of the intent of the government actor.2 8
Those who assert violations of the establishment clause may substantiate
their claims in a variety of ways. First, testimony linking the claimed percep-
tion of endorsement to the undesirable effect of alienation or marginalization
will underscore the seriousness of the claim and enhance the claimants' argu-
ment that it was indeed the government's action, and not something else, that
led the claimants to feel like or be treated as outsiders.21 " Second, while no
claimant should be required to show that some minimum number of persons
understood the government action to endorse religion or to impair claimant's
standing in the political community, the testimony of witnesses from different
backgrounds and situations would further support the asserted connection be-
tween the government action and the claimed effect. A claimant who in-
211. In Kaplan v. City of Burlington, 700 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Vt. 1988), rev'd, 891 F.2d 1024
(2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990), for instance, the trial judge noted that many
of the letters and calls received by the city concerning its sponsorship of a menorah were "bla-
tantly anti-semetic" [sic], and reasoned that "[tihis undermines the weight of these public reac-
tions in determining whether it is objectively reasonable to conclude that the City communicated
an endorsement of religion." Id. at 1321 n.7. But why should the fact that these observers ob-
jected so strongly to the city's action that their position could be characterized as anti-Semitic
indicate that their perception of endorsement was inaccurate, or at thevery least, unreasonable or
disingenuous?
212. See cases cited supra note 199 (cases where plaintiffs presented evidence to support their
perception that government was unconstitutionally endorsing religion).
213. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (explanation of how a government action
aimed at a permissible purpose may still convey an impermissible meaning).
214. See, e.g., Mather v. Village of Mundelein, 699 F. Supp. 1300, 1309 n.7 (N.D. I11. 1988)
(district court rejected village's argument that plaintiff should not have been offended by village's
nativity scene since she had previously been exposed to nativity scenes and other aspects of Chris-
tianity; argument "ignores that the cause of plaintiffs injury may be the impression that govern-
ment is favoring a religion other than her own and not the mere sight of the nativity scene."),
rev'd, 864 F.2d 1291 (7th Cir. 1989).
It is possible that government action could be perceived as endorsing religion and yet not alien-
ate anyone from the political community. If that were the case, then arguably the establishment
clause should not proscribe the action in question. Justice O'Connor's explanation of why govern-
ment endorsement of religion is objectionable, supra notes 24-32 and accompanying text, could be
understood as creating a rebuttable presumption of alienation from proof of perceived endorse-
ment. If so, plaintiffs might be asked to show genuine perceptions of endorsement; the burden
would then shift to the government to persuade the court that the alleged endorsement was harm-
less. See Lupu, Home Education, Religious Liberty, and the Separation of Powers, 67 B.U.L.
REV. 971, 985-87 (1987) (how constitutional doctrine may use burdens of proof to affect relation-
ship of individual liberty and government power).
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troduces evidence not only that he perceived such impairment, but also that
adherents of the favored religion perceived endorsement of their religion,
would be better able to persuade a judge, whose own perspective may be closer
to those of the adherents, that the claimant's perceptions are neither frivolous
nor delusional.2"'
215. See, e.g., Jewish War Veterans of United States v. United States, 695 F. Supp. 1, 6
(D.D.C. 1988) (A Camp Commander wrote a letter congratulating a local commander of Navy
Public Works on building a new cross at naval base, stating "[tihe new cross is larger and much
brighter than its predecessor. Being erected just before the Christmas season reflected superb
timing. Its message and symbolism enrich relationships between the Camp and its surrounding
community."); Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1173 (D.R.I. 1981) (finding that city "ac-
cepted and implemented the view of its predominantly Christian citizens that it is a 'good thing' to
have a creche in a Christmas display ... because it is a good thing to 'keep Christ in Christ-
mas' ") (quoting letter to mayor who supported creche), affd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982),
rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); cf. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890, 900 (1989) ("It is
difficult to view Texas' narrow exemption [for religious publications from sales tax] as anything
but state sponsorship of religious belief, regardless of whether one adopts the perspective of benefi-
ciaries or of uncompensated contributors.").
Such evidence would also respond to those who might argue that the very act of suing over an
alleged establishment clause violation shows that the claimant has not been made to feel like an
outsider, since he is taking advantage of one of the community's paradigmatic mechanisms for
discourse and complaint resolution: the courts. The perceptions of others (that the government's
action made them feel like outsiders or insiders, or that they perceived others to be treated that
way) would enhance the claimant's showing that his perceptions are serious.
Another issue that needs to be considered is the proper scope of appellate review of the trial
court's finding that the government's message is or is not perceived as endorsing religion: should it
be the "clearly erroneous" standard or de novo reexamination? The law is not certain. See Fried-
man v. Board of County Comm'rs, 781 F.2d 777, 779 n.2 (10th Cir. 1985). The Supreme Court
has recently reiterated that appellate courts have the "ultimate power ... to conduct an indepen-
dent review of constitutional claims when necessary." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S.
485, 506 (1984) (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973)). Where "[a] finding of
fact is inseparable from the principles through which it was deduced," even "largely factual ques-
tions" may be too important to entrust to the trier of fact, and therefore, will be considered
"legal" questions for appellate reevaluation. Id. at 501 n.17. On the other hand, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority in Lynch, called the district court's findings "clearly erroneous."
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1983). Justice Brennan, in dissent, explicitly stated that
the "clearly erroneous" standard should be applied and thought that Justice O'Connor had done
so. Id. at 704 n.I I (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor did describe the trial court's find-
ings as "clearly erroneous," but she also stated that the court "was in error as a matter of law."
Id. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring). And, in Wallace, Justice O'Connor made it clear that
ascertaining the meaning of government action is a "mixed question[] of law and fact ... properly
subject to de novo appellate review." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985).
Independent appellate review of findings of endorsement under the test proposed in this Article
is supported by at least two considerations. First, whether to recognize perceptions of endorsement
is largely, but not purely, a question of historical fact. In marginal cases, the court must deter-
mine whether the perception is sufficiently explained. Appellate judges are as capable of doing
that as are trial judges. Second, as discussed in part V(B) below, identifying endorsement is not
the end of the analysis. The court must proceed to balance the evils of endorsement against the
governmental interests at stake. See infra notes 216-63 and accompanying text. Appellate judges
are certainly as competent as trial judges to conduct that evaluation. Moreover, de novo review
does not mean that doctrine will recognize only the judge-based perception of endorsement which
goes under the rubric of the "objective observer." The basic question to.be reviewed remains
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This method will ensure that all claimants have a forum in which to voice
their perspectives. Judges will be compelled to acknowledge these perspectives
and will not be able to end the discussion on the basis that an "objective ob-
server" would perceive no offensive message. A court that finds a perception of
endorsement or disapproval must then decide whether the government's in-
fringement of the interest protected by the .establishment clause is, neverthe-
less, justified.
B. Balancing Perceptions of Endorsement Against Proper Governmental
Objectives
Whether we read the establishment clause with Justice O'Connor to pro-
hibit government from appearing to endorse religion, or with Lemon to pro-
hibit government action that "advances or inhibits" religion, we must be faith-
ful to the Constitution's injunction without crippling government's ability to
address its legitimate goals. Because a blanket proscription of government aid
to or involvement in religion is impossible, even logically incoherent," 6 decid-
ing establishment clause cases requires the court to consider both constitu-
tional values and productive governmental activity.2"7
Once the court finds a perception that government has endorsed religion, the
proposed test shifts the burden to the government to show that its offensive
behavior is nevertheless strongly related to an important secular purpose, in-
cluding the protection of other rights guaranteed by the Constitution.218 This
different: did real members of the community actually perceive an endorsement of religion by the
government?
216. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
217. See L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1284 & n.3. Lemon's designation of "primary" religious
effects may be seen as an implicit balance. Justice O'Connor herself, as explained in Part IV of
this Article, cannot avoid this balancing, even though she purports to do so. See supra notes 189-
93 and accompanying text.
218. Insofar as the proposed test is understood as a balancing test, it is subject to certain typi-
cal criticisms. Generally speaking, the image of a balancing test suggests, ideally, a mechanism
for generating unique outcomes from an objective weighing of determinate, commensurable com-
ponents. Legal balancing tests appear "manipulable" because two rational persons can explain
different outcomes in the same situation in terms of the same test. But while manipulation may
result from the conscious or unconscious attempt to rationalize an outcome reached for other
reasons, it may also represent nothing more than the discrepancy between the image of the bal-
ance and the reality of legal argumentation. Jurisprudence, unlike applied physics, must evaluate
open-ended and incommensurable interests. A method for deciding cases, whether in the form of a
balance or of a less directed enumeration of relevant factors, is not without merit simply because
it does not uncontroversially yield unique outcomes. Indeed, a method can be valuable if it helps
significantly to organize the field of controversy and to ensure consideration of all relevant
interests.
More specifically, controversy cannot be avoided by any amount of fine-tuning of the compo-
nents of the balance. No precise definitions can tell us whether government's purpose is "impor-
tant" enough or whether its means are strongly enough related to that purpose. For instance,
while there might be substantial agreement that some government purposes are "important," such
as the uniform collection of sales tax, Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989)
(exemption from sales tax for religious publications held unconstitutional), or Social Security tax,
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framework is similar to the intermediate scrutiny analysis which the Supreme
Court has applied in a growing number of equal protection cases,2"9 and its
impact on governmental behavior would be analogous.220 Most significantly,
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982) (refusing to exempt Amish employer from
paying Social Security taxes did not violate free exercise clause), characterizing others as "impor-
tant," such as celebrating a national holiday or promoting local retail sales and goodwill, Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 699 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting), appears highly contestable. If rela-
tively few government goals are considered important, then limiting government's use of messages
endorsing religion to those necessary to important ends could unduly constrain government if we
assume, as Professor Smith does, supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text, that almost every
government action may be perceived by someone as endorsing religion. On the other hand, the
description of governmental purposes can be so far manipulated that the term "important" does
not sufficiently constrain government, since the purpose of many government activities can be
described broadly enough to be deemed "important" under any definition.
Whether means are "necessary" to achieve the state's legitimate secular ends depends on how
broadly those ends are defined. For instance, consider remedial instruction programs for poor
schoolchildren, such as the one at issue in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985). If the govern-
ment's goal is "to expand and improve . . . educational programs by various means . . . which
contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived chil-
dren," id. at 404 n.1, then sending public school teachers and other professionals into parochial
schools to teach and counsel disadvantaged students enrolled there would not appear to be neces-
sary to achieve the state's general goal. The remedial program could always be modified to involve
less government involvement in (and therefore, arguably, less apparent endorsement of) religion,
while still serving the general secular goal of enhancing the special educational needs of the disad-
vantaged. But suppose the government defines its goal more specifically-for instance, to provide a
certain number of hours of instruction to the disadvantaged students. Arguably, the New York
City programs in Aguilar could be defined in this way, since "[tihe amount of time that each
professional spends in the parochial school is determined by the number of students in the particu-
lar program and the needs of these students." Id. at 406. It may very well be that this specific goal
cannot be reached except by sending the public school teachers onto the parochial school campus.
The danger of manipulation may not be as great as it might seem, because the two possibilities
for manipulation described above are inversely related: each tends to "correct" the other. The
more broadly the government defines its goals in an effort to establish their importance, the more
difficult it will be for government to establish that the chosen means (which are perceived to
endorse religion and to alienate) are necessary to accomplish those goals. See infra note 225 (dis-
cussing relationship of means to ends). Still, there is a large amount of play in the joints, and we
should not allow the spurious precision of calibrating the balance in a particular way (important
versus compelling, necessary versus substantially related) to distract us from the arguments be-
hind the metaphor.
219. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1601-18 (discussing intermediate scrutiny generally).
220. Cf. id. at 1604-07 (discussing a third technique of intermediate scrutiny which requires
"focusing on the challenged rule . . . from the perspective of the disadvantaged group itself").
Among other things, intermediate scrutiny, under the equal protection clause, requires the follow-
ing of courts and government. (Note how each requirement is paralleled under the proposed estab-
lishment clause test). First, the governmental classification at issue must serve a sufficiently im-
portant purpose; not just any legitimate state function will do. Cf infra notes 231, 239-40, 242-45
and accompanying text (proposed test requires court to distinguish more important secular pur-
poses from less important ones). Second, the court should view the challenged rule from the per-
spective of the disadvantaged group itself, rather than from an "objectively neutral" perspective or
one deferential to the legislature. Clearly, incorporating actual perceptions of endorsement into
establishment clause analysis performs this task. Third, government must articulate a convincing
rationale for the classification; the court will not supply one. Fourth, that rationale must not be a
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the proposed test compels government to take the possibility of alienation and
distortion of political discourse into account and to explain how, in striving to
accomplish its legitimate secular functions, it sought to minimize the alienat-
ing effects of its actions. The test advises government not to presume that
actions touching upon religion, even if benign in intent, are innocuous. It re-
quires government to contemplate the negative impact that its conduct may
have on citizens' capacity to view each other and themselves as equal members
of the political community, and not to risk that harm except for very good
reasons. Official conduct will not be upheld unless government can persuade
the court that any such negative impact is a more or less unavoidable side
effect of its effort to fulfill more or less obligatory governmental functions.22
Let us examine how various types of establishment clause disputes might be
analyzed under the proposed method. One persistent source of controversy is
government aid to parochial schools. Such aid, in whatever form, certainly
helps religion in its educational functions; it also creates perceptions that gov-
ernment has endorsed religion. The government's response that any assistance
to religion is an unavoidable side effect of its legitimate exercise of power fol-
lows more or less directly from the Court's acceptance of nonpublic schools in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters:2 "if the State must satisfy its interest in secular
education through the instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in
the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational func-
tion." '223 The Court's effort to mediate between the government's interest in
education and the apparent unconstitutionality of providing material aid to
religious institutions has yielded the crazy-quilt of school aid decisions of the
last twenty years.22
purely after-the-fact rationalization. Professor Tribe observes that this requirement "enhanc[es]
political accountability: a legislature or agency that cannot count on the post-hoc rationalizations
of those charged with responsibility to enforce and defend its enactments . . . might be motivated
to ventilate more fully the considerations underlying those enactments." L. TRIBE, supra note 52,
at 1607.
221. The idea that government must avoid religious symbols if possible has been suggested by
at least three Supreme Court Justices. County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chap-
ter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3114 (1989) (Blackmun, J.) (citing School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 295 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (establishment clause forbids use of religious
means to serve secular ends when secular means suffice)); see also Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct.
at 3129-34 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (strong presumption against
governmental use of religious symbolism). Justice Blackmun believes that government's failure to
use an available secular alternative does not necessarily violate the establishment clause but is an
"obvious factor" in the endorsement analysis. Allegheny County, 109 S. Ct. at 3114 n.67 (empha-
sis omitted); cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 52, at 1285 (stating that the establishment clause prohibits
government from "us[ing] religious tools where secular ones would do"). The test proposed in this
Article is analogous-for "religious tools," read "messages endorsing or disapproving reli-
gion"-but contains the following modification: even if secular tools will not suffice, the govern-
ment's secular goal must be sufficiently important to justify the sending of religious messages.
222. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Oregon could not constitutionally require all children to attend pub-
licly operated schools).
223. Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247 (1968) (White, J.).
224. See supra note 22 (briefly describing the seemingly inconsistent, recent establishment
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Under the proposed test, whether a court upholds the aid program will de-
pend on two issues. First, is the purpose sufficiently important? Second, are
the resulting perceptions of endorsement more or less inevitable, or could the
government reasonably have adopted some other means of addressing its goal
that would probably have mitigated the alienation? To answer the first ques-
tion, the court must explain whether the goal of ensuring that all schools, pub-
lic and private, meet certain educational standards is important enough to
warrant the resulting harm to the political standing ideal. If the court decides
that the purpose is sufficiently important, the government must still persuade
the court that in designing and implementing a particular school aid program,
it took into account the extent to which the program might engender percep-
tions of endorsement of religion, and sought to minimize those consequences to
the greatest extent consistent with the achievement of its purpose. This might
include, for example, both explaining to those likely to be alienated why the
program was worth the constitutional costs and remaining open to being per-
suaded that an alternative would have better accommodated both interests.2 2 5
This method not only expands the conversation about school aid to include
the viewpoints of outsiders,2 6 but yields at least two additional jurisprudential
clause jurisprudence).
225. The two parts of the government's explanatory burden are interrelated, not separate. For
instance, it can be argued that government's commitment to minimum educational standards for
all students can be satisfied without any material assistance to religious schools at all. Government
can simply monitor all schools to ensure compliance with standards, and discontinue schools that
fail to meet those standards. While monitoring would involve some "entanglement" of the sort
that the Supreme Court has found in the past to invalidate certain programs, see Aguilar v. Fel-
ton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), it would likely generate less perceived endorsement than any other
method of ensuring minimum standards, such as material assistance to parochial schools to bring
them up to standards. Thus, there will always be a less offensive alternative to any particular
school aid program.
However, the consequence of the absolute no-aid position is that students in private schools that
could not afford to maintain standards would have to return to the public schools. Government
could argue that the ensuing influx of students into an already strained public school system would
further lower achievement in those schools, and would thus disserve government's broader purpose
of enhancing educational opportunity for as many students as possible. Thus, analyzing the less
offensive alternative issue leads back to the first issue: is government's purpose important enough?
This line of reasoning suggests that once the purpose is held sufficiently important, govern-
ment's choice of means for implementing that purpose must be given some deference, based on
government's assessment of its budget, its expertise in the area, and its continuing administrative
responsibility in that area. The proposed test forces government to convince the court that it has
thought through the possible alienating effects of its actions, but the test does not require the court
to second-guess each detail of the government's program. In many areas of legitimate government
activity, therefore, the proposed test's "bite" is placed at the first question: whether the purpose is
sufficiently important.
226. Of course, in an important sense not a mere "conversation" but a raging debate involving
"insiders" and "outsiders" surrounds the school aid and many other establishment clause contro-
versies. See infra note 257 and accompanying text (school textbook cases). The point is that cur-
rent constitutional doctrine does not envision debate at all, but instead a pseudo-scientific calcula-
tion of direct versus indirect effects, or a determination of the "objective" meaning of government
action. This Article contends that doctrine itself should adopt the model of discourse rather than
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benefits. First, by bringing to the surface the assessment of establishment
clause values and governmental goals, the proposed test compels judges to con-
nect their decisions more directly to what they consider important about the
establishment clause. This is preferable to trying to fix the line between "di-
rect" and "indirect" assistance to religion, which is simply not a principled
decision, or, worse yet, trying to determine whether government action "objec-
tively" communicates an endorsement of religion. 2
Second, the proposed test enhances at least the apparent rationality of con-
stitutional doctrine by avoiding the hairsplitting that Lemon's application has
produced.228 Most cases close to the current line of constitutionality, whatever
their resolution, arise out of perceptions that government has endorsed or dis-
approved of religion, and the search for fine distinctions among these percep-
tions is unproductive at best and disingenuous at worst. Few people other than
certain legal professionals would actually perceive loans of textbooks to paro-
chial school students to be much more or less of an endorsement of religion
than loans of tape recorders, globes, and maps to the parochial schools them-
selves.22 9 Because the same governmental goal is involved in both situations
objectivist analysis.
227. See Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 53
("Although case-by-case balancing does not create certainty, it puts the Court's prejudices up
front rather than allowing it to justify decisions by reference to inappropriate precedent and un-
conincing doctrine.").
228. See supra note 22 (briefly discussing the seemingly inconsistent, recent establishment
clause jurisprudence).
229. Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (lending textbooks to private
school students constitutional) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (lending other in-
structional materials directly to private schools unconstitutional). In Meek, it should be noted,
only Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Powell thought that Pennsylvania could constitutionally
lend books to parochial school students but not other materials to the schools themselves. Three
Justices would have invalidated both parts of ,the school aid program, while three others thought
that both parts of the program were constitutional. It should also be noted that in Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (invalidating public loans of instructional materials to children at-
tending private schools), the Court frankly acknowledged the "tension" between Allen and Meek.
Id. at 251 n.18. The Court agreed to follow Allen as a matter of stare decisis but declined to
extend it. Id.
Of course, proof of credible perceptions of endorsement of religion may vary in different chal-
lenges to otherwise similar government behavior. It thus might appear that one local government's
action could be held constitutional and the same action by another locality unconstitutional, de-
pending on the nature of the respective proofs. The resulting unpredictability would not provide
governments with much guidance on the constitutionality of proposed actions, some of which in-
volve the investment of much time and money. Moreover, if the relative strength of the showing of
perceptions of endorsement and consequent alienation may affect the balance, one might wonder
why the constitutionality of a government program should turn on the degree of perceived en-
dorsement instead of the degree of actual government aid to, and involvement in, religion, which
can be measured in certain more objective ways, such as dollars spent, location of services, and so
on. See Smith, supra note 22, at 303, 307-08 ("[A] doctrinal test or principle which focuses upon
the message, rather than upon the underlying evil reflected in that message, seems positively per-
verse.") (emphasis in original).
However, as explained in the text, since the constitutionality of government action under the
proposed method does not depend exclusively on perceptions of endorsement, the threat of incon-
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and the means chosen to accomplish that goal are, presumably, strongly re-
lated to it, then under the proposed test, either both programs would be consti-
tutional or both would be unconstitutional.230 Which outcome prevails in both
cases depends on whether the court considers the goal of ensuring a certain
quality of nonpublic education to be sufficiently important to outweigh any
consequent distortion of the ideal of equal political standing.231 And whether
the evil of the perceived endorsement is outweighed by the good to be attained
would be a matter of "definitional or general balancing,"2 2 in which higher
federal courts would strike the balance between a given set of interests. The
courts would thus help to prevent a "balkanization" of constitutional doctrine
without mandating a nationally-uniform interpretation of the "meaning" of
government's action.233
A second issue, recently decided by the Supreme Court, is the constitution-
ality of the Equal Access Act of 1984.28 Some public secondary schools have
created "limited open forums" by permitting "noncurriculum related" student
groups to meet on school premises outside of normal school hours. Under the
act, a school that does so may not use the content of the speech at such meet-
ings, including religious content, as a basis for denying any students "equal
access or a fair opportunity" to meet.2 " In Board of Education v. Mergens,236
the Court held the Equal Access Act constitutional.2 7
sistency is minimized.
230. The same point applies to religious display cases. See infra note 247 and accompanying
text.
231. The argument is not that this will always be an easy question to resolve. The need to draw
lines will always be present, and cases close to the line can always be posed. To their credit, the
majority of Justices in Allegheny County recognize this. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3107-08 (1989) (Blackmun, J.); id. at 3120
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Rather, the point is that the
proposed test would shift the line to a location that makes more sense in terms of the values
underlying the establishment clause.
232. Shiffrin, Government Speech. 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 610-11 (1980).
233. Cf. Ingber, supra note 79, at 325 & nn.574-76 (religion clauses require nationwide, not
local, definition of "religion" in order to prevent "a constitutional balkanizing inconsistent with
our traditional view of the Constitution as a unifying symbol").
It is of course possible that different governmental bodies confronting similar tasks-for exam-
ple, whether and how to assist private schools-will formulate their objectives in different terms.
Conceivably, this could affect the courts' decisions, since the government must persuade the court
that its objective is sufficiently important. But to the extent that one government does not learn
the most plausible and persuasive ways to formulate its objectives from others' litigation, presuma-
bly the courts can help insure that constitutionality does not turn on the cleverness with which
various governments describe their programs.
234. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (Supp. V 1987).
235. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a), (b).
236. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
237. Id. at 2370-73. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Blackmun, reasoned that Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), which upheld a similar
policy at the university level, applied just as well to high schools. Justice O'Connor looked to a
Congressional finding that high school students were as capable as college students of understand-
ing that "a school does not endorse or support student speech that it merely permits on a nondis-
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The proposed test begins with the likely perception that government en-
dorses religion when it permits student religious groups to meet on public
school grounds. 38 The court must then inquire whether any secular purpose at
which government aimed the legislation is sufficiently important to justify the
perception of endorsement. It might be difficult for government to formulate
such a purpose convincingly. Encouraging noncurriculum related student
groups in general is one possibility.239 Promoting free speech is another, al-
though it seems somewhat inconsistent with the public school's extensive right
to control student speech in other contexts.24 If the court does not hold that
the purpose is sufficiently important, then the school cannot make its facilities
available to noncurriculum related student groups. If, however, the court is
criminatory basis." Id. at 2372. Furthermore, the "broad spectrum" of noncurriculum related
student groups active at Westside High School (which did not, however, happen to include any
other groups advocating a controversial religious, political, or philosophical position) and the non-
participation of school officials at group meetings negated any "reasonable" perception of endorse-
ment. Id. at 2372-73. Justices Kennedy and Scalia concurred, following Kennedy's interpretation
of the establishment- clause in Allegheny County. Id. at 2377-78. Justices Marshall and Brennan
agreed that the Equal Access Act need not violate the clause but concurred in the judgment only,
stipulating that Westside must explicitly disclaim sponsorship or endorsement of the religious
group. Id. at 2378-83. Finally, Justice Stevens dissented, primarily on the ground that Westside
had not created a "limited open forum" in the sense Congress intended in the Equal Access Act
and, therefore, that the school was not required to allow the Christian Club to meet. Id. at 2383-
93. According to Stevens, a high school creates a "limited open forum" obligating it to allow
religious groups to meet only if it permits extracurricular groups "advocating partisan theological,
political, or ethical views." Id. at 2385.
238. The courts have repeatedly indicated that the impressionability of elementary and second-
ary school students exacerbates the threat of endorsement. See Garnett v. Renton School Dist.,
874 F.2d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 1989), modifying 865 F.2d 1121, vacated, 110 S. Ct. 2608 (1990). In
Garnett, the Ninth Circuit held that allowing student religious groups to meet in a high school
classroom before the start of the school day would violate the establishment clause. 874 F.2d at
610. The court reasoned that the Equal Access Act was inapplicable: the high school was not a
"limited open forum" because all of the student groups permitted to meet at the school were
curriculum related. Id. at 612-14. The court further reasoned that "the impressionability of young
students, compulsory attendance laws that make students a captive audience, and the role of pub-
lic schools in inculcating democratic ideals [all] distinguish public secondary schools from public
universities." 'Id. at 612; see supra note 169. But cf Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372 (finding that:
Congress specifically rejected the argument that high school students are likely to
confuse an equal access policy with state sponsorship of religion. . . .[Congress de-
termined that] "students below the college level are capable of distinguishing between
State-initiated, school sponsored, or teacher-led religious speech on the one hand and
student-initiated, student-led religious speech on the other")
(quoting S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 8, 35 (1984)).
239. In Mergens, the school board's policy encouraged student clubs in general as a "vital part
of the total education program as a means of developing citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good
human relations, knowledge and skills." 867 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 110 S.' Ct.
2356 (1990). Whether the school board has a strong interest in promoting partisan ideological
student clubs is another question. As a matter of statutory interpretation, this is the issue that
divided Justice Stevens from other Court members. See supra note 237 (discussing Mergens).
240. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (high school princi-
pal's editorial control over school-sponsored student newspaper did not violate students' first
amendment rights).
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persuaded that some such purpose is sufficiently important, the government
would probably be able to satisfy its burden of showing that it adopted the
least offensive means of accomplishing its goal, because the act explicitly
grants equal footing to religious and nonreligious interests. Indeed, by discrim-
inating against religious groups, government would probably be perceived as
taking an even more pronounced position on religion.24
Consider next the constitutionality of a governmental display incorporating
religious imagery. If the display generates a perception that government has
endorsed religion, the court must ask if the government's purpose in sponsor-
ing the display is important enough in general to warrant the harm of endorse-
ment. The proposed test, unlike current doctrine, invites the court to distin-
guish more important secular purposes from less important ones. 4"
Celebrating a national holiday or promoting local retail sales and good-
will-the purposes offered in Lynch-might well be found to be much less
crucial to the proper functioning of government and society than, say, ensuring
all citizens a minimally adequate education,24 ' or the uniform collection of
sales,2" or Social Security taxes.245 If so, the purpose of the display would not
justify any endorsement of religion. If the court nevertheless decides that the
purpose is important enough to justify some endorsement, the government
must still persuade the court that it has responsibly attempted to reduce the
magnitude of those perceptions-for instance, by avoiding sectarian symbols.
Can liberty be adequately "saluted" without the use of a Christmas tree or
menorah?246 If so, then government is bound to forgo those symbols. If not,
then perhaps the following year, government should reconsider whether "salut-
ing liberty" at Christmas is truly important enough to warrant alienating some
citizens on religious grounds. In either event, the court would recognize rather
241. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public university may allow student reli-
gious group to meet in university facilities without violating establishment clause, and must do so
in order not to violate free speech clause).
Conceived in traditional terms, the equal access cases pose a classic neutrality dilemma: does
government, in providing a benefit, act "neutrally" when it treats religion and nonreligion alike, or
when it excludes religion from the benefit in order not to "aid" religion? See infra note 253
(discussing neutrality ideal). In Mergens, the benefits include official school recognition for the
student religious group, access to the school's public address system, newspaper, and other media,
and meeting space in a location readily accessible to students who are required by law to be on the
premises. The test proposed in this Article avoids the neutrality dilemma by requiring, first, that
the benefit be very important to government's basic functions in order to justify the perceived
endorsement which the benefit to religion engenders, and second, that there be no less offensive
way of delivering the benefit. If allowing noncurriculum related student groups to use school space
passes the first test, then it would appear to pass the second.
242. Currently, any secular purpose satisfies the first prong of Lemon. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 225, 239-40 and accompanying text (education as important purpose); see
also supra note 218 (discussing the significance of labeling a purpose as "important").
244. See Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989).
245. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-58 (1982).
246. The display upheld in Allegheny County was titled "Salute to Liberty." County of Alle-
gheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3095 (1989).
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than ignore the costs of alienation. Also, the proposed test would yield at least
the appearance of a more rational doctrine; the constitutionality of a nativity
scene on government property would be unlikely to turn on the proximity of a
plaster Santa Claus,2 47 or that of a menorah on the proximity of a Christmas
tree.
As a final example, suppose a complaint that the National Gallery of Art
promotes religion by displaying works of art featuring Madonnas and other
sectarian subjects. Justice O'Connor would peremptorily dismiss that percep-
tion as unreasonable. The context, she believes, "changes what viewers may
fairly understand to be the purpose of the display-as a typical museum set-
ting ...negates any message of endorsement of [religious] content." 49 But
surely one can imagine a perception that the profusion of such images in a
federally funded and managed institution endorses religion by indicating that
Christianity plays a more important part in the national heritage than do
other religions or sects. A court that receives credible evidence of such a per-
ception must begin by acknowledging it. The court might then explain to the
person claiming alienation that maintaining a repository of the most signifi-
cant art is an important secular function of government, and that art histori-
ans, the specialists entrusted with the job of selecting the best works of art, do
not employ subject-matter as a criterion of evaluation.2 49 However, almost all
of the surviving great European works of art created in certain centuries took
Christian themes as their subjects; therefore, a collection of great art from
that period must consist largely of works featuring those themes. Excluding
works of art solely because of their religious imagery would have a chilling
effect on the free speech, and possibly academic freedom, rights of the cura-
tors and the public. Moreover, by adopting such a policy of exclusion, govern-
ment would appear to take a position on religion to a far greater extent than it
247. See, e.g., ACLU v. Wilkinson, 701 F. Supp. 1296, 1306-08, 1311 (E.D. Ky. 1988) (dis-
cussing interpretations of Lynch, including criticism of "Santa Claus too" test), affid, 895 F.2d
1098 (6th Cir. 1990); cf. Mather v. Village of Mundelein, 864 F.2d 1291, 1293 (7th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) ("[we] hope that the Supreme Court will decide County of Allegheny in a way that
diminishes the role of architectural judgment in constitutional law").
248. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (emphasis added); cf. Allegheny
County, 109 S. Ct. at 3132 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("It would be
absurd . .. . to exclude religious paintings by Italian Renaissance masters from a public
museum.").
249. Of course, art historians compare works as greater or lesser examples of a particular
genre, such as Madonnas; however, "Madonnas are better (or worse) than landscapes" is not a
meaningful art-historical judgment.
It is the importance of the purpose here that would justify government's use of imagery per-
ceived to endorse religion, where the use of sectarian imagery in other contexts, such as holiday
displays, would not be justified. In both situations, arguably, government is presenting part of the
national heritage (neutral criterion), which in fact contains sectarian images. However, in the case
of the National Gallery, the purpose of displaying the images is to provide a source for the study
and enjoyment of what experts have selected as the best art. No such purpose is present in the
holiday displays.
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does by deferring to purely secular criteria.25
The case of the National Gallery collection, then, is not frivolous; it raises
major constitutional issues. If we approve of the collection, it should be be-
cause we have thoughtfully assessed the competing constitutional concerns, not
because we have ignored them. The point of the proposed method of analysis is
not necessarily to upset currently accepted practices, but to compel their reex-
amination in light of critical viewpoints that present doctrine excludes.
Some objections to the proposed method merit consideration. First, does any
version of the no endorsement test avoid the pitfalls of the absolute neutrality
ideal, discussed at length by Professor Smith and others?2"1 Professor Smith
contends that Justice O'Connor's theory, despite its analytical shortcomings,
has attracted widespread support because it is the most recent example of "the
long-standing quest to define a position of government neutrality towards reli-
gion. '  As such, Smith argues, the approach is fundamentally unhelpful in
solving problems of church-state relations because the concept of "neutrality"
is both ambiguous and empty.2 55 - Moreover, Justice O'Connor's attempt to
shift the question from whether government action is neutral to whether gov-
ernment appears neutral does not avoid these difficulties. 254
Far from being vitiated as simply another attempt to base constitutional
doctrine on a neutrality standard, however, the proscription against govern-
mental endorsement of religion, as reconceived in this Article, is neither empty
nor radically ambiguous. Just as a free exercise clause case begins with the
believer's perception that her religious practice has been infringed, 255 so estab-
250. In some respects this situation is like that in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (if
university provides classrooms for use by all student groups, it has created a partial open forum to
which student religious groups must receive equal access), in that screening religious works of art
would send a message that government specifically disfavors religion.
251. Smith, supra note 22, at 313-31; Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment
Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83 (1986). Both critiques of neutrality-based theories are
valid, so much so that the scholars are hard pressed to rescue establishment clause theory to the
extent that it depends on an ideal of governmental neutrality. See Smith, supra note 22, at 331
(ideal of neutrality provides no guidance; Smith's own analysis is purely critical and does not
suggest alternatives); Valauri, supra, at 144-50 (purporting to "escape from neutrality dilemma"
by arguing that since principled decisionmaking is impossible, courts should not try to do it, but
should instead defer to the legislature).
252. Smith, supra note 22, at 313.
253. The ideal of neutrality is ambiguous, and thus does not help to answer difficult establish-
ment clause cases, because one cannot choose between the opposing injunctions "don't aid reli-
gion" and "don't inhibit religion" without first deciding on a reference point: aid or inhibit com-
pared to what state of affairs? See P. BOBBITT, supra note 156, at 208 (neutrality ideal ambiguous
without a standard of generality on which ideal depends); Smith, supra note 22, at 314-15 (ana-
lyzing contrasting applications of neutrality ideal to facts of Everson). The emptiness of the neu-
trality ideal is that requiring a decisionmaker to be "neutral" reduces to the command that the
decisionmaker choose between alternative outcomes only in accordance with proper criteria, but
leaves unanswered the crucial question: what are the proper criteria? Smith, supra note 22, at
325-29.
254. Smith, supra note 22, at 319-25.
255. But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990) (majority of Justices ignore
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lishment clause doctrine can start with the citizen's perception that her will-
ingness or ability to participate in the political community has been curtailed
by the government's endorsement of religion.' 56 Under the proposed method of
analysis, establishment clause doctrine does not impractically compel govern-
ment to maintain absolute neutrality with regard to religion, but rather to use
religion as little as possible in addressing its significant secular goals.
Second, the test permits government to make religion relevant to political
claimant's interest in free religious practice, holding that the Constitution does not require any
religious exemption from generally applicable criminal laws).
256. In response to Professor Smith's critique of the no endorsement test as a reconstituted
neutrality-based test, Justice O'Connor's approach can be explained in terms of its focus on the
role of government action in contributing to a public community of discourse (here, about church-
state relations). The "messages" sent by government action are not merely shadows of, or weak
substitutes for, the "actual" impact of government behavior. They are themselves an important
part of our public life insofar as that life involves talking and thinking about the role of religion.
Justice O'Connor is reading the establishment clause to minimize government's role in public
discourse about religion.
Professor Smith seems not to recognize the independent weight and importance of symbolic
behavior, a crucial aspect of Justice O'Connor's insight. For instance, Smith criticizes the use of
the no endorsement idea to protect against political disenfranchisement as follows. The message of
disenfranchisement allegedly sent by government endorsement or disapproval of religion may be
either true or false. That is, government is either discriminating against persons in their civil and
political rights on the basis of religion, as the message indicates, or it is not. If the message is
false, then government is not actually violating the basic premise that political standing should be
independent of religion. If the message is true, "then government is violating that premise; but it
is violating the premise by making religion relevant to political standing, not by sending messages
which accurately acknowledge that fact." Smith, supra note 22, at 308 (emphasis in original).
This reasoning ignores the fact that the message itself colors discourse on church-state relations.
The perception that government favors or disfavors religion can entrench current discriminatory
practices, and may inspire later disenfranchisement where none currently exists.
This principle of abstention differs from the principle of neutrality. A series of government
decrees respectively endorsing the practice of all known religions, as well as the refusal or failure
to practice religion, would seem to satisfy the demands of at least one sense of "neutrality," but
would violate the abstention principle many times over. That this example is not farfetched is
clear from recent litigation. For instance, in Donnelly v. Lynch, the Mayor of Pawtucket, after the
lawsuit was filed challenging the inclusion of the creche in the city's Christmas display, announced
his intention to include a menorah in the following year's display. 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1159
(D.C.R.I. 1981), affd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1983). And in Fox v.
City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978), the city, having
displayed an illuminated Latin cross on city hall at Christmas and Easter for many years, re-
sponded to requests from Eastern Orthodox Christians by authorizing the display of their cross
around the time of the Orthodox Easter, and in theory opened itself to successive requests from
adherents of other religions for similar treatment. Id. at 803, 587 P.2d at 669-76, 150 Cal, Rptr.
at 873-80 (Bird, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Bird recognized that "the majority rightly ob-
ject[ed] to the notion that the city may turn city hall into a vast billboard for religious messages,"
and that "the City Council of Los Angeles has no business deliberating on such questions as what
symbols of other religions are equivalent to the cross and what holidays of other religions are
equivalent to Christmas and Easter." Id. at 805 n.6, 812, 587 P.2d at 671 n.6, 676, 150 Cal. Rptr.
at 875 n.6, 880. Finally, in Allegheny County, Pittsburgh's "Salute to Liberty" posed the same
problem: as Justice Blackmun acknowledged, "[tihe simultaneous endorsement of Judaism and
Christianity is no less constitutionally infirm than the endorsement of Christianity alone." 109 S.
Ct. 3086, 3112 (1989) (holding, however, that this display did not endorse either religion).
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standing only if it has selected, from the alternative means reasonably calcu-
lated to serve its goals, the course of action least offensive to establishment
clause values. This addresses the damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't situ-
ations described by Professor Smith, such as textbook selections by public
school authorities, where the government is likely to generate perceptions that
it has endorsed religion however it acts.287 Under the test, if any of two or
more sufficiently important courses of action will send a message endorsing or
disapproving religion, government must select the one that sends the least of-
fensive message.
But how is a court to define "least offensive"? A head count of those claim-
ing offense would obviously entail the same problems as does the use of major-
ity perceptions to define the meaning of a message. Is the intensity of the
feelings engendered by the perception of endorsement to be considered, and if
so, how? Indeed, difficult as it will be for a court to measure the degree of
offensiveness experienced by the complainants, how can the court possibly
measure the impact of an alternative but purely hypothetical course of govern-
ment action? Any determination seems speculative.
On an abstract level, there is no easy answer to this problem. On the con-
crete level of particular controversies, the difficulty may be mitigated some-
what. In the school textbook cases, for instance, the court might explain to
those who perceive the school district's choice as an endorsement of "secular
humanism" that, by analogy to the Madonnas in the National Gallery, the
selection criteria are nonreligious, which implies that secular humanism is not
a "religion" in first amendment terms.2"' The school district may also seek to
accommodate the practices of those who still feel alienated, for instance, by
excusing them from particular classes.259 But it would be naive to contend that
any method of analyzing such disputes will avoid controversy altogether. The
method proposed in this Article leaves much to the discretion and prudence of
judges. By scrutinizing the government's behavior and its explanations for its
course of action, and by considering the facts of similar controversies else-
where, they must determine whether the government did what it responsibly
257. Smith, supra note 22, at 291 n.103. Professor Smith offers the example of the controversy
over textbooks that allegedly promote secular humanism. The plaintiffs viewed the use of the
books as disapproval of their fundamentalist ideals (and as endorsement of the "religion" of secu-
lar humanism), while others might view removal of the textbooks as an endorsement of the plain-
tiffs' religious beliefs. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir.
1987); Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987). Another example
provided by Professor Smith is based on Lynch v. Donnelly: "[w]hether the creche was included in
or removed from the Christmas display, the sincere religious sensibilities of some citizens would be
offended." Smith, supra note 22, at 311.
258. Professor lngber has argued that religion should be defined for establishment clause pur-
poses to include only generally recognized, or "established," religions. The courts could thereby
exclude from consideration the contention that the use of certain textbooks in public schools en-
dorses the "religion" of secular humanism. See Ingber, supra note 79, at 306 (secular humanism a
"nonreligious ideology").
259. See, e.g., Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 919-40
(1988) (analyzing alternative means of accommodating religious schoolchildren).
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could to avoid endorsing religion.
Third, it might be argued that if the exact strength of the showing of per-
ceptions of endorsement and alienation will not be dispositive in most cases-if
even a small showing is enough to put the government to its burden of justifi-
cation-then there is little point in going through possibly elaborate factual
proof of whether the government's act has actually conveyed a message en-
dorsing religion. It would seem more efficient to ignore the factual inquiry by
presuming perceptions of endorsement.2 60
Justice O'Connor's reconception of the establishment clause itself provides
the answer to this suggestion. The plaintiff's case should not be presumed,
because it is important for constitutional doctrine to acknowledge the percep-
tions of endorsement that surface in response to government action. This re-
sponds to the ideal of discretion and mutual forbearance proposed by Professor
Tushnet and derived from an. article on Engel v. Vitale261 by Arthur Suther-
land.2 62 Tushnet suggests that the best way to resolve the conflicts between
church and state in which the courts have become embroiled, and to reduce
political divisiveness along religious lines, would be for citizens, drawing on a
sense of the public good drawn from the tradition of civic republicanism, to
forgo actions like putting up creches-or suing to have them taken down.26
The ideal of forbearance may be lauded, but constitutional doctrine should
not presume a shared sense of the common good at the expense of concealing
opposing viewpoints and thus cloaking obnoxious government action with re-
spectability. Doctrine should recognize the voices of those who claim that gov-
ernment involvement with religion has marginalized them. And recognition en-
tails not only that judges be willing to hear their complaints, as under current
case law, but that the meaning of the establishment clause should in great
measure depend on their perceptions.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reinterpretation of the establishment clause proposed in this Article re-
quires government to consider the sensibilities of religious and irreligious mi-
norities. At a time when the majority of Congress-along with four members
of the Supreme Court, including Justice O'Connor-clamor to impose a "na-
tional symbol of unity" on nonconformists, 264 it is particularly urgent to pro-
260. This criticism could take on somewhat greater weight in light of the institutionalized na-
ture of much establishment clause litigation. A few "separationist" organizations, such as the
American Civil Liberties Union, bring many establishment clause challenges and coordinate such
litigation nationwide. See generally F. SORAUF, THE WALL OF SEPARATION (1976).
261. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
262. Tushnet, supra note 58, at 736-38 (citing Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel,
76 HARV. L. REv. 25 (1962)).
263. Id. at 736-39; see also Bradley, supra note 227, at 56 (Supreme Court should have denied
certiorari in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1983), because any attempt to resolve the issue
within confines of prior doctrine would multiply rather than reduce doctrinal uncertainty).
264. See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (5-4 decision, holding that free speech
clause prohibits Texas from criminally punishing person for burning American flag as form of
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tect against government's power to send messages of political exclusion. Courts
must apply the establishment clause in light of that need.
political protest). On the flurry of Congressional and executive activity in response to the decision,
see, for example, N.Y. Times, July 24, 1989, at A13, col. 1. President Bush and some members of
Congress sought a constitutional amendment to prohibit flag desecration; others promoted a statu-
tory response instead. On October 28, 1989, Congress passed the Flag Protection Law of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-131, 103 Stat. 777 (1989). In United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990),
the Court, again by a 5-4 vote, held the law unconstitutional. Subsequently, the House of Repre-
sentatives voted two hundred fifty-four to one hundred seventy-seven in favor of a constitutional
amendment, falling thirty-four votes short of the two-thirds necessary to keep the proposal alive.
N.Y. Times, June 22, 1990, at Al, col. 3. Five days later, in a vote superfluous but for partisan
politics, fifty-eight Senators supported the proposed amendment, nine less than the two-thirds
needed to send the proposal to the states had the House not already rejected it. N.Y. Times, June
27, 1990, at B6, col. 5.
